Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Challenge Extension
RFC 8737
Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (February 2020) | |
---|---|---|---|
Author | Roland Bracewell Shoemaker | ||
Last updated | 2020-05-09 | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
IESG | Responsible AD | Roman Danyliw | |
Send notices to | (None) |
RFC 8737
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R.B. Shoemaker Request for Comments: 8737 ISRG Category: Standards Track February 2020 ISSN: 2070-1721 Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Challenge Extension Abstract This document specifies a new challenge for the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol that allows for domain control validation using TLS. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8737. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Terminology 3. TLS with Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) Challenge 4. acme-tls/1 Protocol Definition 5. Security Considerations 6. IANA Considerations 6.1. SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension OID 6.2. ALPN Protocol ID 6.3. ACME Validation Method 7. Normative References Appendix A. Design Rationale Acknowledgments Author's Address 1. Introduction The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555] specification describes methods for validating control of domain names via HTTP and DNS. Deployment experience has shown it is also useful to be able to validate domain control using the TLS layer alone. In particular, this allows hosting providers, Content Distribution Networks (CDNs), and TLS-terminating load balancers to validate domain control without modifying the HTTP handling behavior of their backends. This document specifies a new TLS-based challenge type, tls-alpn-01. This challenge requires negotiating a new application-layer protocol using the TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Extension [RFC7301]. Because this protocol does not build on a pre-existing deployment base, the ability to complete tls-alpn-01 challenges requires changes by service providers, making it explicitly an opt-in process. Because service providers must proactively deploy new code in order to implement tls-alpn-01, we can specify stronger controls in that code, resulting in a stronger validation method. 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. TLS with Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) Challenge The TLS with Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) validation method proves control over a domain name by requiring the ACME client to configure a TLS server to respond to specific connection attempts using the ALPN extension with identifying information. The ACME server validates control of the domain name by connecting to a TLS server at one of the addresses resolved for the domain name and verifying that a certificate with specific content is presented. The tls-alpn-01 ACME challenge object has the following format: type (required, string): The string "tls-alpn-01" token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. This value MUST have at least 128 bits of entropy. It MUST NOT contain any characters outside the base64url alphabet as described in Section 5 of [RFC4648]. Trailing '=' padding characters MUST be stripped. See [RFC4086] for additional information on randomness requirements. The client prepares for validation by constructing a self-signed certificate that MUST contain an acmeIdentifier extension and a