Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)
draft-ietf-core-oscore-key-update-03
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Rikard Höglund , Marco Tiloca | ||
| Last updated | 2022-10-24 | ||
| Replaces | draft-hoeglund-core-oscore-key-limits | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
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draft-ietf-core-oscore-key-update-03
CoRE Working Group R. Höglund
Internet-Draft M. Tiloca
Updates: 8613 (if approved) RISE AB
Intended status: Standards Track 24 October 2022
Expires: 27 April 2023
Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)
draft-ietf-core-oscore-key-update-03
Abstract
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) uses
AEAD algorithms to ensure confidentiality and integrity of exchanged
messages. Due to known issues allowing forgery attacks against AEAD
algorithms, limits should be followed on the number of times a
specific key is used for encryption or decryption. Among other
reasons, approaching key usage limits requires updating the OSCORE
keying material before communications can securely continue.
This document defines how two OSCORE peers must follow these key
usage limits and what steps they must take to preserve the security
of their communications. Also, it specifies Key Update for OSCORE
(KUDOS), a lightweight procedure that two peers can use to update
their keying material and establish a new OSCORE Security Context.
Accordingly, it updates the use of the OSCORE flag bits in the CoAP
OSCORE Option. Finally, this document specifies a method that two
peers can use to update their OSCORE identifiers, as a stand-alone
procedure or embedded in a KUDOS execution. Thus, this document
updates RFC 8613.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful
Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/core-wg/oscore-key-update.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 April 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. AEAD Key Usage Limits in OSCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Problem Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1. Limits for 'q' and 'v' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Additional Information in the Security Context . . . . . 7
2.2.1. Common Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2. Sender Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.3. Recipient Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. OSCORE Messages Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1. Protecting a Request or a Response . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2. Verifying a Request or a Response . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Current methods for Rekeying OSCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Extensions to the OSCORE Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Function for Security Context Update . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. Key Update with Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.1. Client-Initiated Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.2. Server-Initiated Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4. Key Update with or without Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . 26
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4.4.1. Handling and Use of Keying Material . . . . . . . . . 27
4.4.2. Selection of KUDOS Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.5. Preserving Observations across Key Updates . . . . . . . 32
4.5.1. Management of Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.6. Retention Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.7. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.8. Signaling KUDOS support in EDHOC . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5. Update of OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.1. The Recipient-ID Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1.1. Client-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1.2. Server-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update . . . . . . . . . 42
5.1.3. Additional Actions for Stand-Alone Execution . . . . 45
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.1. CoAP Option Numbers Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.3. EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry . . . . . . . 48
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix A. Detailed considerations for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 . . . 50
Appendix B. Estimation of 'count_q' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Appendix C. Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
C.1. Version -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
C.2. Version -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
C.3. Version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1. Introduction
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
[RFC8613] provides end-to-end protection of CoAP [RFC7252] messages
at the application-layer, ensuring message confidentiality and
integrity, replay protection, as well as binding of response to
request between a sender and a recipient.
In particular, OSCORE uses AEAD algorithms to provide confidentiality
and integrity of messages exchanged between two peers. Due to known
issues allowing forgery attacks against AEAD algorithms, limits
should be followed on the number of times a specific key is used to
perform encryption or decryption [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].
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The original OSCORE specification [RFC8613] does not consider such
key usage limits. However, should they be exceeded, an adversary may
break the security properties of the AEAD algorithm, such as message
confidentiality and integrity, e.g., by performing a message forgery
attack. Among other reasons, approaching the key usage limits
requires updating the OSCORE keying material before communications
can securely continue.
This document updates [RFC8613] as follows.
* It defines what steps an OSCORE peer takes to preserve the
security of its communications, by stopping using the OSCORE
Security Context shared with another peer when approaching the key
usage limits.
* It specifies KUDOS, a lightweight key update procedure that the
two peers can use in order to update their current keying material
and establish a new OSCORE Security Context. This deprecates and
replaces the procedure specified in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613].
* With reference to the "OSCORE Flag Bits" registry defined in
Section 13.7 of [RFC8613] as part of the "Constrained RESTful
Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry group, it updates the
entries with Bit Position 0 and 1 (see Section 7), both originally
marked as "Reserved". That is, it defines and registers the usage
of the OSCORE flag bit with Bit Position 0, as the one intended to
expand the space for the OSCORE flag bits in the OSCORE Option
(see Section 4.1). Also, it marks the bit with Bit Position of 1
as "Unassigned".
* It specifies a method that two peers can use to update their
OSCORE identifiers. This can be run as a stand-alone procedure,
or instead embedded in a KUDOS execution.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
related to the CoAP [RFC7252], Observe [RFC7641], CBOR [RFC8949],
OSCORE [RFC8613] and EDHOC [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc].
This document additionally defines the following terminology.
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* Initiator: the peer starting the KUDOS execution, by sending the
first KUDOS message.
* Responder: the peer that receives the first KUDOS message in a
KUDOS execution.
* FS mode: the KUDOS execution mode that achieves forward secrecy
(see Section 4.3).
* No-FS mode: the KUDOS execution mode that does not achieve forward
secrecy (see Section 4.4).
2. AEAD Key Usage Limits in OSCORE
This section details how key usage limits for AEAD algorithms must be
considered when using OSCORE. In particular, it discusses specific
limits for common AEAD algorithms used with OSCORE; necessary
additions to the OSCORE Security Context; and updates to the OSCORE
message processing.
2.1. Problem Overview
The OSCORE security protocol [RFC8613] uses AEAD algorithms to
provide integrity and confidentiality of messages, as exchanged
between two peers sharing an OSCORE Security Context.
When processing messages with OSCORE, each peer should follow
specific limits as to the number of times it uses a specific key.
This applies separately to the Sender Key used to encrypt outgoing
messages, and to the Recipient Key used to decrypt and verify
incoming protected messages.
Exceeding these limits may allow an adversary to break the security
properties of the AEAD algorithm, such as message confidentiality and
integrity, e.g., by performing a message forgery attack.
The following refers to the two parameters 'q' and 'v' introduced in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits], to use when deploying an AEAD algorithm.
* 'q': this parameter has as value the number of messages protected
with a specific key, i.e., the number of times the AEAD algorithm
has been invoked to encrypt data with that key.
* 'v': this parameter has as value the number of alleged forgery
attempts that have been made against a specific key, i.e., the
amount of failed decryptions that have occurred with the AEAD
algorithm for that key.
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When a peer uses OSCORE:
* The key used to protect outgoing messages is its Sender Key from
its Sender Context.
* The key used to decrypt and verify incoming messages is its
Recipient Key from its Recipient Context.
Both keys are derived as part of the establishment of the OSCORE
Security Context, as defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC8613].
As mentioned above, exceeding specific limits for the 'q' or 'v'
value can weaken the security properties of the AEAD algorithm used,
thus compromising secure communication requirements.
Therefore, in order to preserve the security of the used AEAD
algorithm, OSCORE has to observe limits for the 'q' and 'v' values,
throughout the lifetime of the used AEAD keys.
2.1.1. Limits for 'q' and 'v'
Formulas for calculating the security levels, as Integrity Advantage
(IA) and Confidentiality Advantage (CA) probabilities, are presented
in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]. These formulas take as input
specific values for 'q' and 'v' (see section Section 2.1) and for
'l', i.e., the maximum length of each message (in cipher blocks).
For the algorithms shown in Figure 1 that can be used as AEAD
Algorithm for OSCORE, the key property to achieve is having IA and CA
values which are no larger than p = 2^-64, which will ensure a safe
security level for the AEAD Algorithm. This can be entailed by using
the values q = 2^20, v = 2^20, and l = 2^10, that this document
recommends to use for these algorithms.
Figure 1 also shows the resulting IA and CA probabilities enjoyed by
the considered algorithms, when taking the value of 'q', 'v' and 'l'
above as input to the formulas defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].
+------------------------+----------------+----------------+
| Algorithm name | IA probability | CA probability |
|------------------------+----------------+----------------|
| AEAD_AES_128_CCM | 2^-64 | 2^-66 |
| AEAD_AES_128_GCM | 2^-97 | 2^-89 |
| AEAD_AES_256_GCM | 2^-97 | 2^-89 |
| AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | 2^-73 | - |
+------------------------+----------------+----------------+
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Figure 1: Probabilities for algorithms based on chosen q, v and l
values.
When AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 is used as AEAD Algorithm for OSCORE, the
triplet (q, v, l) considered above yields larger values of IA and CA.
Hence, specifically for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8, this document recommends
using the triplet (q, v, l) = (2^20, 2^14, 2^8). This is
appropriate, since the resulting CA and IA values are not greater
than the threshold value of 2^-50 defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits], and thus yields an acceptable security
level. Achieving smaller values of CA and IA would require to
inconveniently reduce 'q', 'v' or 'l', with no corresponding increase
in terms of security, as further elaborated in Appendix A.
+------------------------+----------+----------+-----------+
| Algorithm name | l=2^6 in | l=2^8 in | l=2^10 in |
| | bytes | bytes | bytes |
|------------------------+----------+----------|-----------|
| AEAD_AES_128_CCM | 1024 | 4096 | 16384 |
| AEAD_AES_128_GCM | 1024 | 4096 | 16384 |
| AEAD_AES_256_GCM | 1024 | 4096 | 16384 |
| AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 | 1024 | 4096 | 16384 |
| AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | 4096 | 16384 | 65536 |
+------------------------+----------+----------+-----------+
Figure 2: Maximum length of each message (in bytes)
2.2. Additional Information in the Security Context
In addition to what defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC8613], the OSCORE
Security Context MUST also include the following information.
2.2.1. Common Context
The Common Context is extended to include the following parameter.
* 'exp': with value the expiration time of the OSCORE Security
Context, as a non-negative integer. The parameter contains a
numeric value representing the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC until the specified UTC date/time,
ignoring leap seconds, analogous to what specified for NumericDate
in Section 2 of [RFC7519].
At the time indicated in this field, a peer MUST stop using this
Security Context to process any incoming or outgoing message, and
is required to establish a new Security Context to continue
OSCORE-protected communications with the other peer.
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2.2.2. Sender Context
The Sender Context is extended to include the following parameters.
* 'count_q': a non-negative integer counter, keeping track of the
current 'q' value for the Sender Key. At any time, 'count_q' has
as value the number of messages that have been encrypted using the
Sender Key. The value of 'count_q' is set to 0 when establishing
the Sender Context.
* 'limit_q': a non-negative integer, which specifies the highest
value that 'count_q' is allowed to reach, before stopping using
the Sender Key to process outgoing messages.
The value of 'limit_q' depends on the AEAD algorithm specified in
the Common Context, considering the properties of that algorithm.
The value of 'limit_q' is determined according to Section 2.1.1.
Note for implementation: it is possible to avoid storing and
maintaining the counter 'count_q'. Rather, an estimated value to be
compared against 'limit_q' can be computed, by leveraging the Sender
Sequence Number of the peer and (an estimate of) the other peer's. A
possible method to achieve this is described in Appendix B. While
this relieves peers from storing and maintaining the precise
'count_q' value, it results in overestimating the number of
encryptions performed with a Sender Key. This in turn results in
approaching 'limit_q' sooner and thus in performing a key update
procedure more frequently.
2.2.3. Recipient Context
The Recipient Context is extended to include the following
parameters.
* 'count_v': a non-negative integer counter, keeping track of the
current 'v' value for the Recipient Key. At any time, 'count_v'
has as value the number of failed decryptions occurred on incoming
messages using the Recipient Key. The value of 'count_v' is set to
0 when establishing the Recipient Context.
* 'limit_v': a non-negative integer, which specifies the highest
value that 'count_v' is allowed to reach, before stopping using
the Recipient Key to process incoming messages.
The value of 'limit_v' depends on the AEAD algorithm specified in
the Common Context, considering the properties of that algorithm.
The value of 'limit_v' is determined according to Section 2.1.1.
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2.3. OSCORE Messages Processing
In order to keep track of the 'q' and 'v' values and ensure that AEAD
keys are not used beyond reaching their limits, the processing of
OSCORE messages is extended as defined in this section. A limitation
that is introduced is that, in order to not exceed the selected value
for 'l', the total size of the COSE plaintext, authentication Tag,
and possible cipher padding for a message may not exceed the block
size for the selected algorithm multiplied with 'l'.
In particular, the processing of OSCORE messages follows the steps
outlined in Section 8 of [RFC8613], with the additions defined below.
2.3.1. Protecting a Request or a Response
Before encrypting the COSE object using the Sender Key, the 'count_q'
counter MUST be incremented.
If 'count_q' exceeds the 'limit_q' limit, the message processing MUST
be aborted. From then on, the Sender Key MUST NOT be used to encrypt
further messages.
2.3.2. Verifying a Request or a Response
If an incoming message is detected to be a replay (see Section 7.4 of
[RFC8613]), the 'count_v' counter MUST NOT be incremented.
If the decryption and verification of the COSE object using the
Recipient Key fails, the 'count_v' counter MUST be incremented.
After 'count_v' has exceeded the 'limit_v' limit, incoming messages
MUST NOT be decrypted and verified using the Recipient Key, and their
processing MUST be aborted.
3. Current methods for Rekeying OSCORE
Two peers communicating using OSCORE may choose to renew their shared
keying information by establishing a new OSCORE Security Context for
a variety of reasons. A particular reason is approaching the limits
set for key usage defined in Section 2.1.1. Practically, when the
relevant limits have been reached for an OSCORE Security Context, the
two peers have to establish a new OSCORE Security Context, in order
to continue using OSCORE for secure communication. That is, the two
peers have to establish new Sender and Recipient Keys, as the keys
actually used by the AEAD algorithm.
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In addition to approaching the key usage limits, there may be other
reasons for a peer to initiate a key update procedure. These
include: the OSCORE Security Context approaching its expiration time,
as per the 'exp' parameter defined in Section 2.2.1; application
policies prescribing a regular key rollover; approaching the
exhaustion of the Sender Sequence Number space in the OSCORE Sender
Context.
It is RECOMMENDED that the peer initiating the key update procedure
starts it with some margin, i.e., well before actually experiencing
the trigger event forcing to perform a key update, e.g., the OSCORE
Security Context expiration or the exhaustion of the Sender Sequence
Number space. If the rekeying is not initiated ahead of these
events, it may become practically impossible to perform a key update
with certain methods.
Other specifications define a number of ways for rekeying OSCORE, as
summarized below.
* The two peers can run the procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of
[RFC8613]. That is, the two peers exchange three or four
messages, protected with temporary Security Contexts adding
randomness to the ID Context.
As a result, the two peers establish a new OSCORE Security Context
with new ID Context, Sender Key and Recipient Key, while keeping
the same OSCORE Master Secret and OSCORE Master Salt from the old
OSCORE Security Context.
This procedure does not require any additional components to what
OSCORE already provides, and it does not provide forward secrecy.
The procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613] is used in
6TiSCH networks [RFC7554][RFC8180] when handling failure events.
That is, a node acting as Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC) assists
new devices, namely "pledges", to securely join the network as per
the Constrained Join Protocol [RFC9031]. In particular, a pledge
exchanges OSCORE-protected messages with the JRC, from which it
obtains a short identifier, link-layer keying material and other
configuration parameters. As per Section 8.3.3 of [RFC9031], a
JRC that experiences a failure event may likely lose information
about joined nodes, including their assigned identifiers. Then,
the reinitialized JRC can establish a new OSCORE Security Context
with each pledge, through the procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of
[RFC8613].
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* The two peers can run the OSCORE profile [RFC9203] of the
Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
(ACE) Framework [RFC9200].
When a CoAP client uploads an Access Token to a CoAP server as an
access credential, the two peers also exchange two nonces. Then,
the two peers use the two nonces together with information
provided by the ACE Authorization Server that issued the Access
Token, in order to derive an OSCORE Security Context.
This procedure does not provide forward secrecy.
* The two peers can run the EDHOC key exchange protocol based on
Diffie-Hellman and defined in [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc], in order to
establish a pseudo-random key in a mutually authenticated way.
Then, the two peers can use the established pseudo-random key to
derive external application keys. This allows the two peers to
securely derive an OSCORE Master Secret and an OSCORE Master Salt,
from which an OSCORE Security Context can be established.
This procedure additionally provides forward secrecy.
* If one peer is acting as LwM2M Client and the other peer as LwM2M
Server, according to the OMA Lightweight Machine to Machine Core
specification [LwM2M], then the LwM2M Client peer may take the
initiative to bootstrap again with the LwM2M Bootstrap Server, and
receive again an OSCORE Security Context. Alternatively, the
LwM2M Server can instruct the LwM2M Client to initiate this
procedure.
If the OSCORE Security Context information on the LwM2M Bootstrap
Server has been updated, the LwM2M Client will thus receive a
fresh OSCORE Security Context to use with the LwM2M Server.
In addition to that, the LwM2M Client, the LwM2M Server as well as
the LwM2M Bootstrap server are required to use the procedure
defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613] and overviewed above, when
they use a certain OSCORE Security Context for the first time
[LwM2M-Transport].
Manually updating the OSCORE Security Context at the two peers should
be a last resort option, and it might often be not practical or
feasible.
Even when any of the alternatives mentioned above is available, it is
RECOMMENDED that two OSCORE peers update their Security Context by
using the KUDOS procedure as defined in Section 4 of this document.
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4. Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)
This section defines KUDOS, a lightweight procedure that two OSCORE
peers can use to update their keying material and establish a new
OSCORE Security Context.
KUDOS relies on the OSCORE Option defined in [RFC8613] and extended
as defined in Section 4.1, as well as on the support function
updateCtx() defined in Section 4.2.
The message exchange between the two peers is defined in Section 4.3,
with particular reference to the stateful FS mode providing forward
secrecy. Building on the same message exchange, the possible use of
the stateless no-FS mode is defined in Section 4.4, as intended to
peers that are not able to write in non-volatile memory. Two peers
MUST run KUDOS in FS mode if they are both capable to.
The key update procedure fulfills the following properties.
* KUDOS can be initiated by either peer. In particular, the client
or the server may start KUDOS by sending the first rekeying
message.
* The new OSCORE Security Context enjoys forward secrecy, unless
KUDOS is run in no-FS mode (see Section 4.4).
* The same ID Context value used in the old OSCORE Security Context
is preserved in the new Security Context. Furthermore, the ID
Context value never changes throughout the KUDOS execution.
* KUDOS is robust against a peer rebooting, and it especially avoids
the reuse of AEAD (nonce, key) pairs.
* KUDOS completes in one round trip. The two peers achieve mutual
proof-of-possession in the following exchange, which is protected
with the newly established OSCORE Security Context.
4.1. Extensions to the OSCORE Option
In order to support the message exchange for establishing a new
OSCORE Security Context, this document extends the use of the OSCORE
Option originally defined in [RFC8613] as follows.
* This document defines the usage of the eight least significant
bit, called "Extension-1 Flag", in the first byte of the OSCORE
Option containing the OSCORE flag bits. This flag bit is
specified in Section 7.2.
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When the Extension-1 Flag is set to 1, the second byte of the
OSCORE Option MUST include the OSCORE flag bits 8-15.
* This document defines the usage of the least significant bit
"Nonce Flag", 'd', in the second byte of the OSCORE Option
containing the OSCORE flag bits 8-15. This flag bit is specified
in Section 7.2.
When it is set to 1, the compressed COSE object contains a
'nonce', to be used for the steps defined in Section 4.3. The 1
byte 'x' following 'kid context' (if any) encodes the length of
'nonce', together with signaling bits that indicate the specific
behavior to adopt during the KUDOS execution. Specifically, the
encoding of 'x' is as follows:
- The four least significant bits encode the 'nonce' length in
bytes minus 1, namely 'm'.
- The fifth least significant bit is the "No Forward Secrecy" 'p'
bit. The sender peer indicates its wish to run KUDOS in FS
mode or in no-FS mode, by setting the 'p' bit to 0 or 1,
respectively. This makes KUDOS possible to run also for peers
that cannot support the FS mode. At the same time, two peers
MUST run KUDOS in FS mode if they are both capable to, as per
Section 4.3. The execution of KUDOS in no-FS mode is defined
in Section 4.4.
- The sixth least significant bit is the "Preserve Observations"
'b' bit. The sender peer indicates its wish to preserve
ongoing observations beyond the KUDOS execution or not, by
setting the 'b' bit to 1 or 0, respectively. The related
processing is defined in Section 4.5.
- The seventh and eight least significant bits are reserved for
future use. These bits SHALL be set to zero when not in use.
According to this specification, if any of these bits are set
to 1, the message is considered to be malformed and
decompression fails as specified in item 2 of Section 8.2 of
[RFC8613].
Hereafter, this document refers to a message where the 'd' flag is
set to 0 as "non KUDOS (request/response) message", and to a
message where the 'd' flag is set to 1 as "KUDOS (request/
response) message".
* The second-to-eighth least significant bits in the second byte of
the OSCORE Option containing the OSCORE flag bits are reserved for
future use. These bits SHALL be set to zero when not in use.
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According to this specification, if any of these bits are set to
1, the message is considered to be malformed and decompression
fails as specified in item 2 of Section 8.2 of [RFC8613].
Figure 3 shows the OSCORE Option value including also 'nonce'.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 <----- n bytes ----->
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------------------+
|1|0|0|h|k| n | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | d | Partial IV (if any) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------------------+
<- 1 byte -> <----- s bytes ------> <- 1 byte -> <--- m + 1 bytes --->
+------------+----------------------+---------------------------------+
| s (if any) | kid context (if any) | x (if any) | nonce (if any) |
+------------+----------------------+------------+--------------------+
/ \____
/ |
/ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
+------------------+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| kid (if any) ... | | |0|0|b|p| m | |
+------------------+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
Figure 3: The OSCORE Option value, including 'nonce'
4.2. Function for Security Context Update
The updateCtx() function shown in Figure 4 takes as input three
parameters X, N and CTX_IN. In particular, X and N are built from
the 'x' and 'nonce' fields transported in the OSCORE Option value of
the exchanged KUDOS messages (see Section 4.3.1), while CTX_IN is the
OSCORE Security Context to update. The function returns a new OSCORE
Security Context CTX_OUT.
As a first step, the updateCtx() function builds the two CBOR byte
strings X_cbor and N_cbor, with value the input parameter X and N,
respectively. Then, it builds X_N, as the byte concatenation of
X_cbor and N_cbor.
After that, the updateCtx() function derives the new values of the
Master Secret and Master Salt for CTX_OUT. In particular, the new
Master Secret is derived through a KUDOS-Expand() step, which takes
as input the Master Secret value from the Security Context CTX_IN,
the literal string "key update", X_N and the length of the Master
Secret. Instead, the new Master Salt takes N as value.
The definition of KUDOS-Expand depends on the key derivation function
used for OSCORE by the two peers, as specified in CTX_IN.
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If the key derivation function is an HKDF Algorithm (see Section 3.1
of [RFC8613]), then KUDOS-Expand is mapped to HKDF-Expand [RFC5869],
as shown below. Also, the hash algorithm is the same one used by the
HKDF Algorithm specified in CTX_IN.
KUDOS-Expand(CTX_IN.MasterSecret, ExpandLabel, oscore_key_length) =
HKDF-Expand(CTX_IN.MasterSecret, ExpandLabel, oscore_key_length)
If a future specification updates [RFC8613] by admitting different
key derivation functions than HKDF Algorithms (e.g., KMAC as based on
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 hash functions), that specification has to
update also the present document in order to define the mapping
between such key derivation functions and KUDOS-Expand.
When an HKDF Algorithm is used, the derivation of new values follows
the same approach used in TLS 1.3, which is also based on HKDF-Expand
(see Section 7.1 of [RFC8446]) and used for computing new keying
material in case of key update (see Section 4.6.3 of [RFC8446]).
After that, the new Master Secret and Master Salt parameters are used
to derive a new Security Context CTX_OUT as per Section 3.2 of
[RFC8613]. Any other parameter required for the derivation takes the
same value as in the Security Context CTX_IN. Finally, the function
returns the newly derived Security Context CTX_OUT.
Since the updateCtx() function also takes X as input, the derivation
of CTX_OUT also considers as input the information from the 'x' field
transported in the OSCORE Option value of the exchanged KUDOS
messages. In turn, this ensures that, if successfully completed, a
KUDOS execution occurs as intended by the two peers.
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updateCtx(X, N, CTX_IN) {
CTX_OUT // The new Security Context
MSECRET_NEW // The new Master Secret
MSALT_NEW // The new Master Salt
X_cbor = bstr .cbor X // CBOR bstr wrapping of X
N_cbor = bstr .cbor N // CBOR bstr wrapping of N
X_N = X_cbor | N_cbor
oscore_key_length = < Size of CTX_IN.MasterSecret in bytes >
Label = "key update"
MSECRET_NEW = KUDOS-Expand-Label(CTX_IN.MasterSecret, Label,
X_N, oscore_key_length)
= KUDOS-Expand(CTX_IN.MasterSecret, ExpandLabel,
oscore_key_length)
MSALT_NEW = N;
< Derive CTX_OUT using MSECRET_NEW and MSALT_NEW,
together with other parameters from CTX_IN >
Return CTX_OUT;
}
Where ExpandLabel is defined as
struct {
uint16 length = oscore_key_length;
opaque label<7..255> = "oscore " + Label;
opaque context<0..255> = X_N;
} ExpandLabel;
Figure 4: Function for deriving a new OSCORE Security Context
4.3. Key Update with Forward Secrecy
This section defines the actual KUDOS procedure performed by two
peers to update their OSCORE keying material. Before starting KUDOS,
the two peers share the OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD. Once
successfully completed the KUDOS execution, the two peers agree on a
newly established OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW.
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The following specifically defines how KUDOS is run in its stateful
FS mode achieving forward secrecy. That is, in the OSCORE Option
value of all the exchanged KUDOS messages, the "No Forward Secrecy"
bit is set to 0.
In order to run KUDOS in FS mode, both peers have to be able to write
in non-volatile memory the OSCORE Master Secret and OSCORE Master
Salt from the newly derived Security Context CTX_NEW. If this is not
the case, the two peers have to run KUDOS in its stateless no-FS mode
(see Section 4.4).
When running KUDOS, each peer contributes by generating a fresh value
N1 or N2, and providing it to the other peer. Furthermore, X1 and X2
are the value of the 'x' byte specified in the OSCORE Option of the
first and second KUDOS message, respectively. As defined in
Section 4.3.1, these values are used by the peers to build the input
N and X to the updateCtx() function, in order to derive a new OSCORE
Security Context. As for any new OSCORE Security Context, the Sender
Sequence Number and the replay window are re-initialized accordingly
(see Section 3.2.2 of [RFC8613]).
Once a peer has successfully derived the new OSCORE Security Context
CTX_NEW, that peer MUST use CTX_NEW to protect outgoing non KUDOS
messages.
Also, that peer MUST terminate all the ongoing observations [RFC7641]
that it has with the other peer as protected with the old Security
Context CTX_OLD, unless the two peers have explicitly agreed
otherwise as defined in Section 4.5. More specifically, if either or
both peers indicate the wish to cancel their observations, those will
be all cancelled following a successful KUDOS execution.
Note that, even though that peer had no real reason to update its
OSCORE keying material, running KUDOS can be intentionally exploited
as a more efficient way to terminate all the ongoing observations
with the other peer, compared to sending one cancellation request per
observation (see Section 3.6 of [RFC7641]).
Once a peer has successfully decrypted and verified an incoming
message protected with CTX_NEW, that peer MUST discard the old
Security Context CTX_OLD.
KUDOS can be started by the client or the server, as defined in
Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2, respectively. The following
properties hold for both the client- and server-initiated version of
KUDOS.
* The initiator always offers the fresh value N1.
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* The responder always offers the fresh value N2
* The responder is always the first one deriving the new OSCORE
Security Context CTX_NEW.
* The initiator is always the first one achieving key confirmation,
hence the first one able to safely discard the old OSCORE Security
Context CTX_OLD.
* Both the initiator and the responder use the same respective
OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient ID. Also, they both preserve and
use the same OSCORE ID Context from CTX_OLD.
If the client acts as initiator (see Section 4.3.1), the server MUST
include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in its response sent
as the second KUDOS message. This prevents the AEAD nonce used for
the request from being reused for a later response protected with the
new OSCORE keying material.
The length of the nonces N1 and N2 is application specific. The
application needs to set the length of each nonce such that the
probability of its value being repeated is negligible. To this end,
each nonce is typically at least 8 bytes long.
Once a peer acting as initiator (responder) has sent (received) the
first KUDOS message, that peer MUST NOT send a non KUDOS message to
the other peer, until having completed the key update process on its
side. The initiator completes the key update process when receiving
the second KUDOS message and successfully verifying it with the new
OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW. The responder completes the key
update process when sending the second KUDOS message, as protected
with the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW.
In the following sections, 'Comb(a,b)' denotes the byte concatenation
of two CBOR byte strings, where the first one has value 'a' and the
second one has value 'b'. That is, Comb(a,b) = bstr .cbor a | bstr
.cbor b, where | denotes byte concatenation.
4.3.1. Client-Initiated Key Update
Figure 5 shows the KUDOS workflow with the client acting as
initiator.
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Client Server
(initiator) (responder)
| |
Generate N1 | |
| |
CTX_1 = | |
updateCtx(X1, N1, | |
CTX_OLD) | |
| |
| Request #1 |
Protect with CTX_1 |------------------->|
| OSCORE Option: | CTX_1 =
| ... | updateCtx(X1, N1,
| d flag: 1 | CTX_OLD)
| X1 |
| Nonce: N1 | Verify with CTX_1
| ... |
| | Generate N2
| |
| | CTX_NEW =
| | updateCtx(Comb(X1,X2),
| | Comb(N1,N2),
| | CTX_OLD)
| |
| Response #1 |
|<-------------------| Protect with CTX_NEW
CTX_NEW = | OSCORE Option: |
updateCtx(Comb(X1,X2), | ... |
Comb(N1,N2), | Partial IV: 0 |
CTX_OLD) | ... |
| |
Verify with CTX_NEW | d flag: 1 |
| X2 |
Discard CTX_OLD | Nonce: N2 |
| ... |
| |
// The actual key update process ends here.
// The two peers can use the new Security Context CTX_NEW.
| |
| Request #2 |
Protect with CTX_NEW |------------------->|
| | Verify with CTX_NEW
| |
| | Discard CTX_OLD
| |
| Response #2 |
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|<-------------------| Protect with CTX_NEW
Verify with CTX_NEW | |
| |
Figure 5: Client-Initiated KUDOS Workflow
First, the client generates a random value N1, and uses the nonce N =
N1 and X = X1 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in
order to derive a temporary Security Context CTX_1.
Then, the client sends an OSCORE request to the server, protected
with the Security Context CTX_1. In particular, the request has the
'd' flag bit set to 1, and specifies X1 as 'x' and N1 as 'nonce' (see
Section 4.1). After that, the client deletes CTX_1.
Upon receiving the OSCORE request, the server retrieves the value N1
from the 'nonce' field of the request, the value X1 from the 'x' byte
of the OSCORE Option, and provides the updateCtx() function with the
input N = N1, X = X1 and the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order
to derive the temporary Security Context CTX_1.
Figure 6 shows an example of how the two peers compute X and N
provided as input to the updateCtx() function, and how they compute
X_N within the updateCtx() function, when deriving CTX_1 (see
Section 4.2).
X1 and N1 expressed as raw values
X1 = 0x80
N1 = 0x018a278f7faab55a
updateCtx() is called with
X = 0x80
N = 0x018a278f7faab55a
In updateCtx(), X_cbor and N_cbor are built as CBOR byte strings
X_cbor = 0x4180 (h'80')
N_cbor = 0x48018a278f7faab55a (h'018a278f7faab55a')
In updateCtx(), X_N is the byte concatenation of X_cbor and N_cbor
X_N = 0x418048018a278f7faab55a
Figure 6: Example of X, N and X\_N computing for the first KUDOS
message
Then, the server verifies the request by using the Security Context
CTX_1.
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After that, the server generates a random value N2, and uses N =
Comb(N1, N2) and X = Comb(X1, X2) together with the old Security
Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the new Security Context CTX_NEW.
An example of this nonce processing on the server with values for N1,
X1, N2 and X2 is presented in Figure 7.
X1, X2, N1 and N2 expressed as raw values
X1 = 0x80
X2 = 0x80
N1 = 0x018a278f7faab55a
N2 = 0x25a8991cd700ac01
X1, X2, N1 and N2 as CBOR byte strings
X1 = 0x4180 (h'80')
X2 = 0x4180 (h'80')
N1 = 0x48018a278f7faab55a (h'018a278f7faab55a')
N2 = 0x4825a8991cd700ac01 (h'25a8991cd700ac01')
updateCtx() is called with
X = 0x41804180
N = 0x48018a278f7faab55a4825a8991cd700ac01
In updateCtx(), X_cbor and N_cbor are built as CBOR byte strings
X_cbor = 0x4441804180 (h'41804180')
N_cbor = 0x5248018a278f7faab55a4825a8991cd700ac01
(h'48018a278f7faab55a4825a8991cd700ac01')
In updateCtx(), X_N is the byte concatenation of X_cbor and N_cbor
X_N = 0x44418041805248018a278f7faab55a4825a8991cd700ac01
Figure 7: Example of X, N and X\_N computing for the second KUDOS
message
Then, the server sends an OSCORE response to the client, protected
with the new Security Context CTX_NEW. In particular, the response
has the 'd' flag bit set to 1 and specifies N2 as 'nonce'. Also, the
server MUST include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in the
response. After that, the server deletes CTX_1.
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Upon receiving the OSCORE response, the client retrieves the value N2
from the 'nonce' field of the response, and the value X2 from the 'x'
byte of the OSCORE Option. Since the client has received a response
to an OSCORE request it made with the 'd' flag bit set to 1, the
client provides the updateCtx() function with the input N = Comb(N1,
N2), X = Comb(X1, X2) and the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order
to derive the new Security Context CTX_NEW. Finally, the client
verifies the response by using the Security Context CTX_NEW and
deletes the old Security Context CTX_OLD.
Then, the client can send a new OSCORE request protected with the new
Security Context CTX_NEW.
When successfully verifying the request using the Security Context
CTX_NEW, the server deletes the old Security Context CTX_OLD and can
reply with an OSCORE response protected with the new Security Context
CTX_NEW.
From then on, the two peers can protect their message exchanges by
using the new Security Context CTX_NEW.
Note that the server achieves key confirmation only when receiving a
message from the client as protected with the new Security Context
CTX_NEW. If the server sends a non KUDOS request to the client
protected with CTX_NEW before then, and the server receives a 4.01
(Unauthorized) error response as reply, the server SHOULD delete the
new Security Context CTX_NEW and start a new client-initiated key
update process, by taking the role of initiator as per Figure 5.
Also note that, if both peers reboot simultaneously, they will run
the client-initiated version of KUDOS defined in this section. That
is, one of the two peers implementing a CoAP client will send KUDOS
Request #1 in Figure 5.
4.3.1.1. Avoiding In-Transit Requests During a Key Update
Before sending the KUDOS message Request #1 in Figure 5, the client
MUST ensure that it has no outstanding interactions with the server
(see Section 4.7 of [RFC7252]), with the exception of ongoing
observations [RFC7641] with that server.
If there are any, the client MUST NOT initiate the KUDOS execution,
before either: i) having all those outstanding interactions cleared;
or ii) freeing up the Token values used with those outstanding
interactions, with the exception of ongoing observations with the
server.
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Later on, this prevents a non KUDOS response protected with the new
Security Context CTX_NEW to cryptographically match with both the
corresponding request also protected with CTX_NEW and with an older
request protected with CTX_OLD, in case the two requests were
protected using the same OSCORE Partial IV.
During an ongoing KUDOS execution the client MUST NOT send any non-
KUDOS requests to the server. This could otherwise be possible, if
the client is using a value of NSTART greater than 1 (see Section 4.7
of [RFC7252]).
4.3.2. Server-Initiated Key Update
Figure 8 shows the KUDOS workflow with the server acting as
initiator.
Client Server
(responder) (initiator)
| |
| Request #1 |
Protect with CTX_OLD |------------------->|
| | Verify with CTX_OLD
| |
| | Generate N1
| |
| | CTX_1 =
| | updateCtx(X1, N1,
| | CTX_OLD)
| |
| Response #1 |
|<-------------------| Protect with CTX_1
CTX_1 = | OSCORE Option: |
updateCtx(X1, N1, | ... |
CTX_OLD) | d flag: 1 |
| X1 |
Verify with CTX_1 | Nonce: N1 |
| ... |
Generate N2 | |
| |
CTX_NEW = | |
updateCtx(Comb(X1,X2), | |
Comb(N1,N2 | |
CTX_OLD) | |
| |
| Request #2 |
Protect with CTX_NEW |------------------->|
| OSCORE Option: | CTX_NEW =
| ... | updateCtx(Comb(X1,X2),
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| | Comb(N1,N2),
| d flag: 1 | CTX_OLD)
| X2 |
| Nonce: N1|N2 | Verify with CTX_NEW
| ... |
| | Discard CTX_OLD
| |
// The actual key update process ends here.
// The two peers can use the new Security Context CTX_NEW.
| Response #2 |
|<-------------------| Protect with CTX_NEW
Verify with CTX_NEW | |
| |
Discard CTX_OLD | |
| |
Figure 8: Server-Initiated KUDOS Workflow
First, the client sends a normal OSCORE request to the server,
protected with the old Security Context CTX_OLD and with the 'd' flag
bit set to 0.
Upon receiving the OSCORE request and after having verified it with
the old Security Context CTX_OLD as usual, the server generates a
random value N1 and provides the updateCtx() function with the input
N = N1, X = X1 and the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to
derive the temporary Security Context CTX_1.
Then, the server sends an OSCORE response to the client, protected
with the Security Context CTX_1. In particular, the response has the
'd' flag bit set to 1 and specifies N1 as 'nonce' (see Section 4.1).
After that, the server deletes CTX_1.
Upon receiving the OSCORE response, the client retrieves the value N1
from the 'nonce' field of the response, the value X1 from the 'x'
byte of the OSCORE Option, and provides the updateCtx() function with
the input N = N1, X = X1 and the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in
order to derive the temporary Security Context CTX_1.
Then, the client verifies the response by using the Security Context
CTX_1.
After that, the client generates a random value N2, and provides the
updateCtx() function with the input N = Comb(N1, N2), X = Comb(X1,
X2) and the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the new
Security Context CTX_NEW. Then, the client sends an OSCORE request
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to the server, protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW. In
particular, the request has the 'd' flag bit set to 1 and specifies
N1 | N2 as 'nonce'. After that, the client deletes CTX_1.
Upon receiving the OSCORE request, the server retrieves the value
N1 | N2 from the request and the value X2 from the 'x' byte of the
OSCORE Option. Then, the server verifies that: i) the value N1 is
identical to the value N1 specified in a previous OSCORE response
with the 'd' flag bit set to 1; and ii) the value N1 | N2 has not
been received before in an OSCORE request with the 'd' flag bit set
to 1.
If the verification succeeds, the server provides the updateCtx()
function with the input N = Comb(N1, N2), X = Comb(X1, X2) and the
old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the new Security
Context CTX_NEW. Finally, the server verifies the request by using
the Security Context CTX_NEW and deletes the old Security Context
CTX_OLD.
After that, the server can send an OSCORE response protected with the
new Security Context CTX_NEW.
When successfully verifying the response using the Security Context
CTX_NEW, the client deletes the old Security Context CTX_OLD.
From then on, the two peers can protect their message exchanges by
using the new Security Context CTX_NEW.
Note that the client achieves key confirmation only when receiving a
message from the server as protected with the new Security Context
CTX_NEW. If the client sends a non KUDOS request to the server
protected with CTX_NEW before then, and the client receives a 4.01
(Unauthorized) error response as reply, the client SHOULD delete the
new Security Context CTX_NEW and start a new client-initiated key
update process, by taking the role of initiator as per Figure 5 in
Section 4.3.1.
4.3.2.1. Avoiding In-Transit Requests During a Key Update
Before sending the KUDOS message Request #2 in Figure 8, the client
MUST ensure that it has no outstanding interactions with the server
(see Section 4.7 of [RFC7252]), with the exception of ongoing
observations [RFC7641] with that server.
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If there are any, the client MUST NOT initiate the KUDOS execution,
before either: i) having all those outstanding interactions cleared;
or ii) freeing up the Token values used with those outstanding
interactions, with the exception of ongoing observations with the
server.
Later on, this prevents a non KUDOS response protected with the new
Security Context CTX_NEW to cryptographically match with both the
corresponding request also protected with CTX_NEW and with an older
request protected with CTX_OLD, in case the two requests were
protected using the same OSCORE Partial IV.
During an ongoing KUDOS execution the client MUST NOT send any non-
KUDOS requests to the server. This could otherwise be possible, if
the client is using a value of NSTART greater than 1 (see Section 4.7
of [RFC7252]).
4.3.2.2. Preventing Deadlock Situations
When the server-initiated version of KUDOS is used, the two peers
risk to run into a deadlock, if all the following conditions hold.
* The client is a client-only device, i.e., it does not act as CoAP
server and thus does not listen for incoming requests.
* The server needs to execute KUDOS, which, due to the previous
point, can only be performed in its server-initiated version as
per Figure 8. That is, the server has to wait for an incoming non
KUDOS request, in order to initiate KUDOS by replying with the
first KUDOS message as a response.
* The client sends only Non-confirmable CoAP requests to the server
and does not expect responses sent back as reply, hence freeing up
a request's Token value once the request is sent.
In such a case, in order to avoid experiencing a deadlock situation
where the server needs to execute KUDOS but cannot practically
initiate it, a client-only device that supports KUDOS SHOULD
intersperse Non-confirmable requests it sends to that server with
confirmable requests.
4.4. Key Update with or without Forward Secrecy
The FS mode of the KUDOS procedure defined in Section 4.3 ensures
forward secrecy of the OSCORE keying material. However, it requires
peers executing KUDOS to preserve their state (e.g., across a device
reboot), by writing information such as data from the newly derived
OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW in non-volatile memory.
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This can be problematic for devices that cannot dynamically write
information to non-volatile memory. For example, some devices may
support only a single writing in persistent memory when initial
keying material is provided (e.g., at manufacturing or commissioning
time), but no further writing after that. Therefore, these devices
cannot perform a stateful key update procedure, and thus are not
capable to run KUDOS in FS mode to achieve forward secrecy.
In order to address these limitations, KUDOS can be run in its
stateless no-FS mode, as defined in the following. This allows two
peers to achieve the same results as when running KUDOS in FS mode
(see Section 4.3), with the difference that no forward secrecy is
achieved and no state information is required to be dynamically
written in non-volatile memory.
From a practical point of view, the two modes differ as to what exact
OSCORE Master Secret and Master Salt are used as part of the OSCORE
Security Context CTX_OLD provided as input to the updateCtx()
function (see Section 4.2).
If either or both peers are not able to write in non-volatile memory
the OSCORE Master Secret and OSCORE Master Salt from the newly
derived Security Context CTX_NEW, then the two peers have to run
KUDOS in no-FS mode.
4.4.1. Handling and Use of Keying Material
In the following, a device is denoted as "CAPABLE" if it is able to
store information in non-volatile memory (e.g., on disk), beyond a
one-time-only writing occurring at manufacturing or
(re-)commissioning time. If that is not the case, the device will be
denoted as "non-CAPABLE".
The following terms are used to refer to OSCORE keying material.
* Bootstrap Master Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt. If pre-
provisioned during manufacturing or (re-)commissioning, these
OSCORE Master Secret and Master Salt are initially stored on disk
and are never going to be overwritten by the device.
* Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt. These OSCORE Master
Secret and Master Salt can be dynamically updated by the device.
In case of reboot, they are lost unless they have been stored on
disk.
Note that:
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* A peer running KUDOS can have none of the pairs above associated
with another peer, only one or both.
* A peer that has neither of the pairs above associated with another
peer, cannot run KUDOS in any mode with that other peer.
* A peer that has only one of the pairs above associated with
another peer can attempt to run KUDOS with that other peer, but
the procedure might fail depending on the other peer's
capabilities. In particular:
- In order to run KUDOS in FS mode, a peer must be a CAPABLE
device. It follows that two peers have to both be CAPABLE
devices in order to be able to run KUDOS in FS mode with one
another.
- In order to run KUDOS in no-FS mode, a peer must have Bootstrap
Master Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt available as stored on
disk.
* A peer that is a non-CAPABLE device MUST support no-FS mode.
* A peer that is a CAPABLE device MUST support the FS mode and
SHOULD support the no-FS mode.
As a general rule, once successfully generated a new OSCORE Security
Context CTX (e.g., CTX is the CTX_NEW resulting from a KUDOS
execution, or it has been established through the EDHOC protocol
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]), a peer considers the Master Secret and Master
Salt of CTX as Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt. After
that:
* If the peer is a CAPABLE device, it SHOULD store Latest Master
Secret and Latest Master Salt on disk.
As an exception, this does not apply to possible temporary OSCORE
Security Contexts used during a key update procedure, such as
CTX_1 used during the KUDOS execution. That is, the OSCORE Master
Secret and Master Salt from such temporary Security Contexts MUST
NOT be stored on disk.
* The peer MUST store Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt in
volatile memory, thus making them available to OSCORE message
processing and possible key update procedures.
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4.4.1.1. Actions after Device Reboot
Building on the above, after having experienced a reboot, a peer A
checks whether it has stored on disk a pair P1 = (Latest Master
Secret, Latest Master Salt) associated with any another peer B.
* If a pair P1 is found, the peer A performs the following actions.
- The peer A loads the Latest Master Secret and Latest Master
Salt to volatile memory, and uses them to derive an OSCORE
Security Context CTX_OLD.
- The peer A runs KUDOS with the other peer B, acting as
initiator. If the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it stores on
disk the Master Secret and Master Salt from the newly
established OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW, as Latest Master
Secret and Latest Master Salt, respectively.
* If a pair P1 is not found, the peer A checks whether it has stored
on disk a pair P2 = (Bootstrap Master Secret, Bootstrap Master
Salt) associated with the other peer B.
- If a pair P2 is found, the peer A performs the following
actions.
o The peer A loads the Bootstrap Master Secret and Bootstrap
Master Salt to volatile memory, and uses them to derive an
OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD.
o If the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it stores on disk
Bootstrap Master Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt as Latest
Master Secret and Latest Master Salt, respectively. This
supports the situation where A is a CAPABLE device and has
never run KUDOS with the other peer B before.
o The peer A runs KUDOS with the other peer B, acting as
initiator. If the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it stores on
disk the Master Secret and Master Salt from the newly
established OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW, as Latest
Master Secret and Latest Master Salt, respectively.
- If a pair P2 is not found, the peer A has to use alternative
ways to establish a first OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW with
the other peer B, e.g., by running the EDHOC protocol. After
that, if A is a CAPABLE device, it stores on disk the OSCORE
Master Secret and Master Salt from the newly established OSCORE
Security Context CTX_NEW, as Latest Master Secret and Latest
Master Salt, respectively.
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4.4.2. Selection of KUDOS Mode
During a KUDOS execution, the two peers agree on whether to perform
the key update procedure in FS mode or no-FS mode, by leveraging the
"No Forward Secrecy" bit, 'p', in the 'x' byte of the OSCORE Option
value of the KUDOS messages (see Section 4.1). The 'p' bit
practically determines what OSCORE Security Context to use as CTX_OLD
during the KUDOS execution, consistently with the indicated mode.
* If the 'p' bit is set to 0 (FS mode), the updateCtx() function
used to derive CTX_1 or CTX_NEW considers as input CTX_OLD the
current OSCORE Security Context shared with the other peer as is.
In particular, CTX_OLD includes Latest Master Secret as OSCORE
Master Secret and Latest Master Salt as OSCORE Master Salt.
* If the 'p' bit is set to 1 (no-FS mode), the updateCtx() function
used to derive CTX_1 or CTX_NEW considers as input CTX_OLD the
current OSCORE Security Context shared with the other peer, with
the following difference: Bootstrap Master Secret is used as
OSCORE Master Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt is used as OSCORE
Master Salt. That is, every execution of KUDOS in no-FS mode
between these two peers considers the same pair (Master Secret,
Master Salt) in the OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD provided as
input to the updateCtx() function, hence the impossibility to
achieve forward secrecy.
A peer determines to run KUDOS either in FS or no-FS mode with
another peer as follows.
* If a peer A is not a CAPABLE device, it MUST run KUDOS only in no-
FS mode. That is, when sending a KUDOS message, it MUST set to 1
the 'p' bit of the 'x' byte in the OSCORE Option value.
* If a peer A is a CAPABLE device, it SHOULD run KUDOS only in FS
mode and SHOULD NOT run KUDOS as initiator in no-FS mode. That
is, when sending a KUDOS message, it SHOULD set to 0 the 'p' bit
of the 'x' byte in the OSCORE Option value. An exception applies
in the following cases.
- The peer A is running KUDOS with another peer B, which A has
learned to not be a CAPABLE device (and hence not able to run
KUDOS in FS mode).
Note that, if the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it is able to
store such information about the other peer B on disk and it
MUST do so. From then on, the peer A will perform every
execution of KUDOS with the peer B in no-FS mode, including
after a possible reboot.
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- The peer A is acting as responder and running KUDOS with
another peer B without knowing its capabilities, and A receives
a KUDOS message where the 'p' bit of the 'x' byte in the OSCORE
Option value is set to 1.
* If the peer A is a CAPABLE device and has learned that another
peer B is also a CAPABLE device (and hence able to run KUDOS in FS
mode), then the peer A MUST NOT run KUDOS with the peer B in no-FS
mode. This also means that, if the peer A acts as responder when
running KUDOS with the peer B, the peer A MUST terminate the KUDOS
execution if it receives a KUDOS message from the peer B where the
'p' bit of the 'x' byte in the OSCORE Option value is set to 1.
Note that, if the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it is able to store
such information about the other peer B on disk and it MUST do so.
This ensures that the peer A will perform every execution of KUDOS
with the peer B in FS mode. In turn, this prevents a possible
downgrading attack, aimed at making A believe that B is not a
CAPABLE device, and thus to run KUDOS in no-FS mode although the
FS mode can actually be used by both peers.
Within the limitations above, two peers running KUDOS generate the
new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW according to the mode indicated
per the bit 'p' set by the responder in the second KUDOS message.
If, after having received the first KUDOS message, the responder can
continue performing KUDOS, the bit 'p' in the reply message has the
same value as in the bit 'p' set by the initiator, unless the value
is 0 and the responder is not a CAPABLE device. More specifically:
* If both peers are CAPABLE devices, they will run KUDOS in FS mode.
That is, both initiator and responder sets the 'p' bit to 0 in the
respective sent KUDOS message.
* If both peers are non-CAPABLE devices or only the peer acting as
initiator is a non-CAPABLE device, they will run KUDOS in no-FS
mode. That is, both initiator and responder sets the 'p' bit to 1
in the respective sent KUDOS message.
* If only the peer acting as initiator is a CAPABLE device and it
has knowledge of the other peer being a non-CAPABLE device, they
will run KUDOS in no-FS mode. That is, both initiator and
responder sets the 'p' bit to 1 in the respective sent KUDOS
message.
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* If only the peer acting as initiator is a CAPABLE device and it
has no knowledge of the other peer being a non-CAPABLE device,
they will not run KUDOS in FS mode and will rather set to ground
for possibly retrying in no-FS mode. In particular, the initiator
sets the 'p' bit of its sent KUDOS message to 0. Then:
- If the responder is a server, it MUST reply with a 5.03
(Service Unavailable) error response. The response MUST be
protected with the newly derived OSCORE Security Context
CTX_NEW. The diagnostic payload MAY provide additional
information. In the error response, the 'p' bit MUST be set to
1.
When receiving the error response, the initiator learns that
the responder is not a CAPABLE device (and hence not able to
run KUDOS in FS mode). The initiator MAY try running KUDOS
again. If it does so, the initiator MUST set the 'p' bit to 1,
when sending a new request as first KUDOS message.
- If the responder is a client, it sends to the initiator the
second KUDOS message as a new request, which MUST be protected
with the newly derived OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW. In the
newly sent request, the 'p' bit MUST be set to 1.
When receiving the new request above (i.e., with the 'p' bit
set to 1 as a follow-up to the previous KUDOS response having
the 'p' bit set to 0), the initiator learns that the responder
is not a CAPABLE device (and hence not able to run KUDOS in FS
mode).
In either case, both KUDOS peers delete the OSCORE Security Contexts
CTX_1 and CTX_NEW.
4.5. Preserving Observations across Key Updates
As defined in Section 4.3, once a peer has completed the KUDOS
execution and successfully derived the new OSCORE Security Context
CTX_NEW, that peer normally terminates all the ongoing observations
it has with the other peer [RFC7641], as protected with the old
OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD.
This section describes a method that the two peers can use to safely
preserve the ongoing observations that they have with one another,
beyond the completion of a KUDOS execution. In particular, this
method ensures that an Observe notification can never successfully
cryptographically match against the Observe requests of two different
observations, i.e., against an Observe request protected with CTX_OLD
and an Observe request protected with CTX_NEW.
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The actual preservation of ongoing observations has to be agreed by
the two peers at each execution of KUDOS that they run with one
another, as defined in Section 4.5.1. If, at the end of a KUDOS
execution, the two peers have not agreed on that, they MUST terminate
the ongoing observations that they have with one another, just as
defined in Section 4.3.
[
NOTE: While a dedicated signaling would have to be introduced, this
rationale may be of more general applicability, i.e., in case an
update of the OSCORE keying material is performed through a different
means than KUDOS.
]
4.5.1. Management of Observations
As per Section 3.1 of [RFC7641], a client can register its interest
in observing a resource at a server, by sending a registration
request including the Observe Option with value 0.
If the server registers the observation as ongoing, the server sends
back a successful response also including the Observe Option, hence
confirming that an entry has been successfully added for that client.
If the client receives back the successful response above from the
server, then the client also registers the observation as ongoing.
In case the client can ever consider to preserve ongoing observations
beyond a key update as defined below, then the client MUST NOT simply
forget about an ongoing observation if not interested in it anymore.
Instead, the client MUST send an explicit cancellation request to the
server, i.e., a request including the Observe Option with value 1
(see Section 3.6 of [RFC7641]). After sending this cancellation
request, if the client does not receive back a response confirming
that the observation has been terminated, the client MUST NOT
consider the observation terminated. The client MAY try again to
terminate the observation by sending a new cancellation request.
In case a peer A performs a KUDOS execution with another peer B, and
A has ongoing observations with B that it is interested to preserve
beyond the key update, then A can explicitly indicate its interest to
do so. To this end, the peer A sets to 1 the bit "Preserve
Observations", 'b', in the 'x' byte of the OSCORE Option value (see
Section 4.1), in the KUDOS message it sends to the other peer B.
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If a peer acting as responder receives the first KUDOS message with
the bit 'b' set to 0, then the peer MUST set to 0 the bit 'b' in the
KUDOS message it sends as follow-up, regardless of its wish to
preserve ongoing observations with the other peer.
If a peer acting as initiator has sent the first KUDOS message with
the bit 'b' set to 0, the peer MUST ignore the bit 'b' in the follow-
up KUDOS message that it receives from the other peer.
After successfully completing the KUDOS execution (i.e., after having
successfully derived the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW), both
peers have expressed their interest in preserving their common
ongoing observations if and only if the bit 'b' was set to 1 in both
the exchanged KUDOS messages. In such a case, each peer X performs
the following actions.
1. The peer X considers all the still ongoing observations that it
has with the other peer, such that X acts as client in those
observations. If there are no such observations, the peer X
takes no further actions. Otherwise, it moves to step 2.
2. The peer X considers all the OSCORE Partial IV values used in the
Observe registration request associated with any of the still
ongoing observations determined at step 1.
3. The peer X determines the value PIV* as the highest OSCORE
Partial IV value among those considered at step 2.
4. In the Sender Context of the OSCORE Security Context shared with
the other peer, the peer X sets its own Sender Sequence Number to
(PIV* + 1), rather than to 0.
As a result, each peer X will "jump" beyond the OSCORE Partial IV
(PIV) values that are occupied and in use for ongoing observations
with the other peer where X acts as client.
Note that, each time it runs KUDOS, a peer must determine if it
wishes to preserve ongoing observations with the other peer or not,
before sending its KUDOS message.
To this end, the peer should also assess the new value that PIV*
would take after a successful completion of KUDOS, in case ongoing
observations with the other peer are going to be preserved. If the
peer considers such a new value of PIV* to be too close to the
maximum possible value admitted for the OSCORE Partial IV, then the
peer may choose to run KUDOS with no intention to preserve its
ongoing observations with the other peer, in order to "start over"
from a fresh, entirely unused PIV space.
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Application policies can further influence whether attempting to
preserve observations beyond a key update is appropriate or not.
4.6. Retention Policies
Applications MAY define policies that allow a peer to temporarily
keep the old Security Context CTX_OLD beyond having established the
new Security Context CTX_NEW and having achieved key confirmation,
rather than simply overwriting CTX_OLD with CTX_NEW. This allows the
peer to decrypt late, still on-the-fly incoming messages protected
with CTX_OLD.
When enforcing such policies, the following applies.
* Outgoing non KUDOS messages MUST be protected by using only
CTX_NEW.
* Incoming non KUDOS messages MUST first be attempted to decrypt by
using CTX_NEW. If decryption fails, a second attempt can use
CTX_OLD.
* When an amount of time defined by the policy has elapsed since the
establishment of CTX_NEW, the peer deletes CTX_OLD.
A peer MUST NOT retain CTX_OLD beyond the establishment of CTX_NEW
and the achievement of key confirmation, if any of the following
conditions holds: CTX_OLD is expired (see Section 2.2.1); an amount
'limit_v' of failed decryptions and verifications of incoming
messages has been experienced, by using the Recipient Key of the
Recipient Context of CTX_OLD (see Section 2.3.2).
4.7. Discussion
KUDOS is intended to deprecate and replace the procedure defined in
Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613], as fundamentally achieving the same goal,
while displaying a number of improvements and advantages.
In particular, it is especially convenient for the handling of
failure events concerning the JRC node in 6TiSCH networks (see
Section 3). That is, among its intrinsic advantages compared to the
procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613], KUDOS preserves the
same ID Context value, when establishing a new OSCORE Security
Context.
Since the JRC uses ID Context values as identifiers of network nodes,
namely "pledge identifiers", the above implies that the JRC does not
have to perform anymore a mapping between a new, different ID Context
value and a certain pledge identifier (see Section 8.3.3 of
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[RFC9031]). It follows that pledge identifiers can remain constant
once assigned, and thus ID Context values used as pledge identifiers
can be employed in the long-term as originally intended.
4.8. Signaling KUDOS support in EDHOC
The EDHOC protocol defines the transport of additional External
Authorization Data (EAD) within an optional EAD field of the EDHOC
messages (see Section 3.8 of [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]). An EAD field is
composed of one or multiple EAD items, each of which specifies an
identifying 'ead_label' encoded as a CBOR integer, and an 'ead_value'
encoded as a CBOR bstr.
This document defines a new EDHOC EAD item KUDOS_EAD and registers
its 'ead_label' in Section 7.3. By including this EAD item in an
outgoing EDHOC message, a sender peer can indicate whether it
supports KUDOS and in which modes, as well as query the other peer
about its support. The possible values of the 'ead_value' are as
follows:
+------+--------==+----------------------------------------------+
| Name | Value | Description |
+======+==========+==============================================+
| ASK | h'' | Used only in EDHOC message_1. It asks the |
| | (0x40) | recipient peer to specify in EDHOC message_2 |
| | | whether it supports KUDOS. |
+------+----------+----------------------------------------------+
| NONE | h'00' | Used only in EDHOC message_2 and message_3. |
| | (0x4100) | It specifies that the sender peer does not |
| | | support KUDOS. |
+------+----------+----------------------------------------------+
| FULL | h'01' | Used only in EDHOC message_2 and message_3. |
| | (0x4101) | It specifies that the sender peer supports |
| | | KUDOS in FS mode and no-FS mode. |
+------+----------+----------------------------------------------+
| PART | h'02' | Used only in EDHOC message_2 and message_3. |
| | (0x4102) | It specifies that the sender peer supports |
| | | KUDOS in no-FS mode only. |
+------+----------+----------------------------------------------+
When the KUDOS_EAD item is included in EDHOC message_1 with
'ead_value' ASK, a recipient peer that supports the KUDOS_EAD item
MUST specify whether it supports KUDOS in EDHOC message_2.
When the KUDOS_EAD item is not included in EDHOC message_1 with
'ead_value' ASK, a recipient peer that supports the KUDOS_EAD item
MAY still specify whether it supports KUDOS in EDHOC message_2.
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When the KUDOS_EAD item is included in EDHOC message_2 with
'ead_value' FULL or PART, a recipient peer that supports the
KUDOS_EAD item SHOULD specify whether it supports KUDOS in EDHOC
message_3. An exception applies in case, based on application
policies or other context information, the recipient peer that
receives EDHOC message_2 already knows that the sender peer is
supposed to have such knowledge.
When the KUDOS_EAD item is included in EDHOC message_2 with
'ead_value' NONE, a recipient peer that supports the KUDOS_EAD item
MUST NOT specify whether it supports KUDOS in EDHOC message_3.
In the following cases, the recipient peer silently ignores the
KUDOS_EAD item specified in the received EDHOC message, and does not
include a KUDOS_EAD item in the next EDHOC message it sends (if any).
* The recipient peer does not support the KUDOS_EAD item.
* The KUDOS_EAD item is included in EDHOC message_1 with 'ead_value'
different than ASK
* The KUDOS_EAD item is included in EDHOC message_2 or message_3
with 'ead_value' ASK.
* The KUDOS_EAD item is included in EDHOC message_4.
That is, by specifying 'ead_value' ASK in EDHOC message_1, a peer A
can indicate to the other peer B that it wishes to know if B supports
KUDOS and in what mode(s). In the following EDHOC message_2, B
indicates whether it supports KUDOS and in what mode(s), by
specifying either NONE, FULL or PART as 'ead_value'. Specifying the
'ead_value' FULL or PART in EDHOC message_2 also asks A to indicate
whether it supports KUDOS in EDHOC message_3.
To further illustrate the functionality, two examples are presented
below as EDHOC executions where only the new KUDOS_EAD item is shown
when present, and assuming that no other EAD items are used by the
two peers.
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EDHOC EDHOC
Initiator Responder
| |
| EAD_1: (TBD_LABEL, ASK) |
+-------------------------------------------------------->|
| message_1 |
| |
| EAD_2: (TBD_LABEL, FULL) |
|<--------------------------------------------------------+
| message_2 |
| |
| EAD_3: (TBD_LABEL, FULL) |
+-------------------------------------------------------->|
| message_3 |
| |
In the example above, the Initiator asks the EDHOC Responder about
its support for KUDOS ('ead_value' = ASK). In EDHOC message_2, the
Responder indicates that it supports both the FS and no-FS mode of
KUDOS ('ead_value' = FULL). Finally, in EDHOC message_3, the
Initiator indicates that it also supports both the FS and no-FS mode
of KUDOS ('ead_value' = FULL). After the EDHOC execution has
successfully finished, both peers are aware that they both support
KUDOS, in the FS and no-FS modes.
EDHOC EDHOC
Initiator Responder
| |
| EAD_1: (TBD_LABEL, ASK) |
+-------------------------------------------------------->|
| message_1 |
| |
| EAD_2: (TBD_LABEL, NONE) |
|<--------------------------------------------------------+
| message_2 |
| |
+-------------------------------------------------------->|
| message_3 |
| |
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In this second example, the Initiator asks the EDHOC Responder about
its support for KUDOS ('ead_value' = ASK). In EDHOC message_2, the
Responder indicates that it does not support KUDOS at all
('ead_value' = NONE). Finally, in EDHOC message_3, the Initiator
does not include the KUDOS_EAD item, since it already knows that
using KUDOS with the other peer will not be possible. After the
EDHOC execution has successfully finished, the Initiator is aware
that the Responder does not support KUDOS, which the two peers are
not going to use with each other.
5. Update of OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs
This section defines a procedure that two peers can perform, in order
to update the OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs that they use in their
shared OSCORE Security Context.
This procedure can be initiated by either peer. In particular, the
client or the server may start it by sending the first OSCORE IDs
update message. When sending an OSCORE IDs update message, a peer
provides its new intended OSCORE Recipient ID to the other peer.
Furthermore, this procedure can be executed stand-alone, or instead
seamlessly integrated in an execution of KUDOS (see Section 4) using
its FS mode or no-FS mode (see Section 4.4).
* In the former stand-alone case, updating the OSCORE Sender/
Recipient IDs effectively results in updating part of the current
OSCORE Security Context.
That is, both peers derive a new Sender Key, Recipient Key and
Common IV, as defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]. Also, both
peer re-initialize the Sender Sequence Number and the replay
window accordingly, as defined in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC8613].
Since the same Master Secret is preserved, forward secrecy is not
achieved.
As defined in Section 5.1.3, the two peers must take additional
actions to ensure a safe execution of the OSCORE IDs update
procedure.
* In the latter integrated case, the KUDOS initiator (responder)
also acts as initiator (responder) for the OSCORE IDs update
procedure.
[TODO: think about the possibility of safely preserving ongoing
observations following an update of OSCORE IDs alone.]
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5.1. The Recipient-ID Option
The Recipient ID Option defined in this section has the properties
summarized in Figure 9, which extends Table 4 of [RFC7252]. That is,
the option is elective, safe to forward, part of the cache key and
non repeatable.
+------+---+---+---+---+--------------+--------+--------+---------+
| No. | C | U | N | R | Name | Format | Length | Default |
+------+---+---+---+---+--------------+--------+--------+---------+
| | | | | | | | | |
| TBD1 | | | | | Recipient-ID | opaque | 0-7 | (none) |
| | | | | | | | | |
+------+---+---+---+---+--------------+--------+--------+---------+
C=Critical, U=Unsafe, N=NoCacheKey, R=Repeatable
Figure 9: The Recipient-ID Option.
This document particularly defines how this option is used in
messages protected with OSCORE. That is, when the option is included
in an outgoing message, the option value specifies the new OSCORE
Recipient ID that the sender endpoint intends to use with the other
endpoint sharing the OSCORE Security Context.
The Recipient-ID Option is of class E in terms of OSCORE processing
(see Section 4.1 of [RFC8613]).
5.1.1. Client-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update
Figure 10 shows the stand-alone OSCORE IDs update workflow, with the
client acting as initiator.
On each peer, SID and RID denote the OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient
ID of that peer, respectively.
Client Server
(initiator) (responder)
| |
CTX_A { | | CTX_A {
SID = 1 | | SID = 0
RID = 0 | | RID = 1
} | | }
| |
| Request #1 |
Protect |---------------------------------->|
with CTX_A | OSCORE Option: ..., kid:1 | Verify
| Encrypted_Payload { | with CTX_A
| ... |
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| RecipientID: 42 |
| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
// When embedded in KUDOS, CTX_1 is CTX_A,
// and there cannot be application payload.
| |
| Response #1 |
|<----------------------------------| Protect
Verify | OSCORE Option: ... | with CTX_A
with CTX_A | Encrypted_Payload { |
| ... |
| Recipient-ID: 78 |
| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
// When embedded in KUDOS, this message
// is protected using CTX_NEW, and there
// cannot be application payload.
//
// Then, CTX_B builds on CTX_NEW by updating
// the new Sender/Recipient IDs
| |
CTX_B { | | CTX_B {
SID = 78 | | SID = 42
RID = 42 | | RID = 78
} | | }
| |
| Request #2 |
Protect |---------------------------------->|
with CTX_B | OSCORE Option: ..., kid:78 | Verify
| Encrypted_Payload { | with CTX_B
| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
| Response #2 |
|<----------------------------------| Protect
Verify | OSCORE Option: ... | with CTX_B
with CTX_B | Encrypted_Payload { |
| ... |
| Application Payload |
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| } |
| |
Discard | |
CTX_A | |
| |
| Request #3 |
Protect |---------------------------------->|
with CTX_B | OSCORE Option: ..., kid:78 | Verify
| Encrypted_Payload { | with CTX_B
| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| | Discard
| | CTX_A
| |
| Response #3 |
|<----------------------------------| Protect
Verify | OSCORE Option: ... | with CTX_B
with CTX_B | Encrypted_Payload { |
| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
Figure 10: Client-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update Workflow
[TODO: discuss the example]
5.1.2. Server-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update
Figure 11 shows the stand-alone OSCORE IDs update workflow, with the
server acting as initiator.
On each peer, SID and RID denote the OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient
ID of that peer, respectively.
Client Server
(responder) (initiator)
| |
CTX_A { | | CTX_A {
SID = 1 | | SID = 0
RID = 0 | | RID = 1
} | | }
| |
| Request #1 |
Protect |---------------------------------->|
with CTX_A | OSCORE Option: ..., kid:1 | Verify
| Encrypted_Payload { | with CTX_A
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| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
// When (to be) embedded in KUDOS,
// CTX_OLD is CTX_A
| |
| Response #1 |
|<----------------------------------| Protect
Verify | OSCORE Option: ... | with CTX_A
with CTX_A | Encrypted_Payload { |
| ... |
| Recipient-ID: 78 |
| Application Payload |
| } |
// When embedded in KUDOS, this message is
// protected with CTX_1 instead, and
// there cannot be application payload.
| |
CTX_A { | | CTX_A {
SID = 1 | | SID = 0
RID = 0 | | RID = 1
} | | }
| |
| Request #2 |
Protect |---------------------------------->|
with CTX_A | OSCORE Option: ..., kid:1 | Verify
| Encrypted_Payload { | with CTX_A
| ... |
| Recipient-ID: 42 |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
// When embedded in KUDOS, this message is
// protected with CTX_NEW instead, and
// there cannot be application payload.
| |
| Response #2 |
|<----------------------------------| Protect
Verify | OSCORE Option: ... | with CTX_A
with CTX_A | Encrypted_Payload { |
| ... |
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| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
// When embedded in KUDOS, this message is
// protected with CTX_NEW instead, and
// there cannot be application payload.
| |
CTX_B { | | CTX_B {
SID = 78 | | SID = 42
RID = 42 | | RID = 78
} | | }
| |
| Request #3 |
Protect |---------------------------------->|
with CTX_B | OSCORE Option: ..., kid:78 | Verify
| Encrypted_Payload { | with CTX_B
| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
| Response #3 |
|<----------------------------------| Protect
Verify | OSCORE Option: ... | with CTX_B
with CTX_B | Encrypted_Payload { |
| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
Discard | |
CTX_A | |
| |
| Request #4 |
Protect |---------------------------------->|
with CTX_B | OSCORE Option: ..., kid:78 | Verify
| Encrypted_Payload { | with CTX_B
| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
| | Discard
| | CTX_A
| |
| Response #4 |
|<----------------------------------| Protect
Verify | OSCORE Option: ... | with CTX_B
with CTX_B | Encrypted_Payload { |
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| ... |
| Application Payload |
| } |
| |
Figure 11: Server-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update Workflow
[TODO: discuss the example]
5.1.3. Additional Actions for Stand-Alone Execution
After having experienced a loss of state, a peer MUST NOT participate
in a stand-alone OSCORE IDs update procedure with another peer, until
having performed a full-fledged establishment/renewal of an OSCORE
Security Context with the other peer (e.g., by running KUDOS or the
EDHOC protocol [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]).
More precisely, a peer has experienced a loss of state if it cannot
access the latest snapshot of the latest OSCORE Security Context
CTX_OLD or the whole set of OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs that have
been used with the triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt, ID Context)
of CTX_OLD. This can happen, for instance, after a device reboot.
Furthermore, when participating in a stand-alone OSCORE IDs update
procedure, a peer performs the following additional steps.
* When sending an OSCORE IDs update message, the peer MUST specify
its new intended OSCORE Recipient ID as value of the Recipient-ID
Option only if such a Recipient ID is not only available (see
Section 3.3 of [RFC8613], but it has also never been used as
Recipient ID with the current triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt,
ID Context).
* When receiving an OSCORE IDs update message, the peer MUST abort
the procedure if it has already used the identifier specified in
the Recipient-ID Option as its own Sender ID with current triplet
(Master Secret, Master Salt, ID Context).
In order to fulfill the conditions above, a peer has to keep track of
the OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs that it has used with the current
triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt, ID Context) since the latest
update of OSCORE Master Secret (e.g, performed by running KUDOS).
6. Security Considerations
This document mainly covers security considerations about using AEAD
keys in OSCORE and their usage limits, in addition to the security
considerations of [RFC8613].
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Depending on the specific key update procedure used to establish a
new OSCORE Security Context, the related security considerations also
apply.
[TODO: Add more considerations.]
7. IANA Considerations
This document has the following actions for IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.
7.1. CoAP Option Numbers Registry
IANA is asked to enter the following option number to the "CoAP
Option Numbers" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry group.
+--------+--------------+------------+
| Number | Name | Reference |
+--------+--------------+------------+
| TBD | Recipient-ID | [RFC-XXXX] |
+--------+--------------+------------+
The number suggested to IANA for the Recipient-ID Option is 24.
7.2. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry
IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "OSCORE Flag Bits"
registry within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
Parameters" registry group.
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+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| Bit | Name | Description | Reference |
| Position | | | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| 0 | Extension-1 | Set to 1 if the OSCORE Option | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | Flag | specifies a second byte, | |
| | | which includes the OSCORE | |
| | | flag bits 8-15 | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| 8 | Extension-2 | Set to 1 if the OSCORE Option | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | Flag | specifies a third byte, | |
| | | which includes the OSCORE | |
| | | flag bits 16-23 | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| 15 | Nonce Flag | Set to 1 if nonce is present | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | | in the compressed COSE object | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| 16 | Extension-3 | Set to 1 if the OSCORE Option | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | Flag | specifies a fourth byte, | |
| | | which includes the OSCORE | |
| | | flag bits 24-31 | |
| | | | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| 24 | Extension-4 | Set to 1 if the OSCORE Option | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | Flag | specifies a fifth byte, | |
| | | which includes the OSCORE | |
| | | flag bits 32-39 | |
| | | | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| 32 | Extension-5 | Set to 1 if the OSCORE Option | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | Flag | specifies a sixth byte, | |
| | | which includes the OSCORE | |
| | | flag bits 40-47 | |
| | | | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| 40 | Extension-6 | Set to 1 if the OSCORE Option | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | Flag | specifies a seventh byte, | |
| | | which includes the OSCORE | |
| | | flag bits 48-55 | |
| | | | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
| 48 | Extension-7 | Set to 1 if the OSCORE Option | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | Flag | specifies an eigth byte, | |
| | | which includes the OSCORE | |
| | | flag bits 56-63 | |
| | | | |
+----------+-------------+-------------------------------+------------+
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In the same registry, IANA is asked to mark as 'Unassigned' the entry
with Bit Position of 1, i.e., to update the entry as follows.
+----------+------------------+--------------------------+------------+
| Bit | Name | Description | Reference |
| Position | | | |
+----------+------------------+--------------------------+------------+
| 1 | Unassigned | | |
+----------+------------------+--------------------------+------------+
7.3. EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry
IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "EDHOC External
Authorization Data" registry within the "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
Over COSE (EDHOC)" registry group.
+---------+--------------------------------------+--------------------+
| Label | Description | Reference |
+=========+======================================+====================+
| TBD1 | Indicates whether this peer supports | [RFC-XXXX] |
| | KUDOS and in which mode(s) | |
+---------+--------------------------------------+--------------------+
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., and F. Palombini,
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-17, 12
October 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
lake-edhoc-17.txt>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-05, 11 July 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-
limits-05.txt>.
[LwM2M] Open Mobile Alliance, "Lightweight Machine to Machine
Technical Specification - Core, Approved Version 1.2, OMA-
TS-LightweightM2M_Core-V1_2-20201110-A", November 2020,
<http://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/LightweightM2M/
V1_2-20201110-A/OMA-TS-LightweightM2M_Core-
V1_2-20201110-A.pdf>.
[LwM2M-Transport]
Open Mobile Alliance, "Lightweight Machine to Machine
Technical Specification - Transport Bindings, Approved
Version 1.2, OMA-TS-LightweightM2M_Transport-
V1_2-20201110-A", November 2020,
<http://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/LightweightM2M/
V1_2-20201110-A/OMA-TS-LightweightM2M_Transport-
V1_2-20201110-A.pdf>.
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[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7554] Watteyne, T., Ed., Palattella, M., and L. Grieco, "Using
IEEE 802.15.4e Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) in the
Internet of Things (IoT): Problem Statement", RFC 7554,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7554, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7554>.
[RFC8180] Vilajosana, X., Ed., Pister, K., and T. Watteyne, "Minimal
IPv6 over the TSCH Mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH)
Configuration", BCP 210, RFC 8180, DOI 10.17487/RFC8180,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8180>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9031] Vučinić, M., Ed., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M.
Richardson, "Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) for 6TiSCH",
RFC 9031, DOI 10.17487/RFC9031, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9031>.
[RFC9200] Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework
(ACE-OAuth)", RFC 9200, DOI 10.17487/RFC9200, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200>.
[RFC9203] Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,
"The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization
for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework", RFC 9203,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9203, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9203>.
Appendix A. Detailed considerations for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8
For the AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 algorithm when used as AEAD Algorithm for
OSCORE, larger IA and CA values are achieved, depending on the value
of 'q', 'v' and 'l'. Figure 12 shows the resulting IA and CA
probabilities enjoyed by AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8, when taking different
values of 'q', 'v' and 'l' as input to the formulas defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].
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As shown in Figure 12, it is especially possible to achieve the
lowest IA = 2^-50 and a good CA = 2^-70 by considering the largest
possible value of the (q, v, l) triplet equal to (2^20, 2^10, 2^8),
while still keeping a good security level. Note that the value of
'l' does not impact on IA, while CA displays good values for every
considered value of 'l'.
+-----------------------+----------------+----------------+
| 'q', 'v' and 'l' | IA probability | CA probability |
|-----------------------+----------------+----------------|
| q=2^20, v=2^20, l=2^8 | 2^-44 | 2^-70 |
| q=2^15, v=2^20, l=2^8 | 2^-44 | 2^-80 |
| q=2^10, v=2^20, l=2^8 | 2^-44 | 2^-90 |
| q=2^20, v=2^15, l=2^8 | 2^-49 | 2^-70 |
| q=2^15, v=2^15, l=2^8 | 2^-49 | 2^-80 |
| q=2^10, v=2^15, l=2^8 | 2^-49 | 2^-90 |
| q=2^20, v=2^14, l=2^8 | 2^-50 | 2^-70 |
| q=2^15, v=2^14, l=2^8 | 2^-50 | 2^-80 |
| q=2^10, v=2^14, l=2^8 | 2^-50 | 2^-90 |
| q=2^20, v=2^10, l=2^8 | 2^-54 | 2^-70 |
| q=2^15, v=2^10, l=2^8 | 2^-54 | 2^-80 |
| q=2^10, v=2^10, l=2^8 | 2^-54 | 2^-90 |
|-----------------------+----------------+----------------|
| q=2^20, v=2^20, l=2^6 | 2^-44 | 2^-74 |
| q=2^15, v=2^20, l=2^6 | 2^-44 | 2^-84 |
| q=2^10, v=2^20, l=2^6 | 2^-44 | 2^-94 |
| q=2^20, v=2^15, l=2^6 | 2^-49 | 2^-74 |
| q=2^15, v=2^15, l=2^6 | 2^-49 | 2^-84 |
| q=2^10, v=2^15, l=2^6 | 2^-49 | 2^-94 |
| q=2^20, v=2^14, l=2^6 | 2^-50 | 2^-74 |
| q=2^15, v=2^14, l=2^6 | 2^-50 | 2^-84 |
| q=2^10, v=2^14, l=2^6 | 2^-50 | 2^-94 |
| q=2^20, v=2^10, l=2^6 | 2^-54 | 2^-74 |
| q=2^15, v=2^10, l=2^6 | 2^-54 | 2^-84 |
| q=2^10, v=2^10, l=2^6 | 2^-54 | 2^-94 |
+-----------------------+----------------+----------------+
Figure 12: Probabilities for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 based on chosen
q, v and l values.
Appendix B. Estimation of 'count_q'
This section defines a method to compute an estimate of the counter
'count_q' (see Section 2.2.2), hence not requiring a peer to store it
in its own Sender Context.
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This method relies on the fact that, at any point in time, a peer has
performed _at most_ ENC = (SSN + SSN*) encryptions using its own
Sender Key, where:
* SSN is the current value of this peer's Sender Sequence Number.
* SSN* is the current value of other peer's Sender Sequence Number.
That is, SSN* is an overestimation of the responses without
Partial IV that this peer has sent.
Thus, when protecting an outgoing message (see Section 2.3.1), the
peer aborts the message processing if the estimated est_q > limit_q,
where est_q = (SSN + X) and X is determined as follows.
* If the outgoing message is a response, X is the Partial IV
specified in the corresponding request that this peer is
responding to. Note that X < SSN* always holds.
* If the outgoing message is a request, X is the highest Partial IV
value marked as received in this peer's Replay Window plus 1, or 0
if it has not accepted any protected message from the other peer
yet. That is, X is the highest Partial IV specified in message
received from the other peer, i.e., the highest seen Sender
Sequence Number of the other peer. Note that, also in this case,
X < SSN* always holds.
Appendix C. Document Updates
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.
C.1. Version -02 to -03
* Use of the OSCORE flag bit 0 to signal more flag bits.
* In UpdateCtx(), open for future key derivation different than
HKDF.
* Simplified updateCtx() to use only Expand(); used to be METHOD 2.
* Included the Partial IV if the second KUDOS message is a response.
* Added signaling of support for KUDOS in EDHOC.
* Clarifications on terminology and reasons for rekeying.
* Updated IANA considerations.
* Editorial improvements.
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C.2. Version -01 to -02
* Extended terminology.
* Moved procedure for preserving observations across key updates to
main body.
* Moved procedure to update OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs to main
body.
* Moved key update without forward secrecy section to main body.
* Define signaling bits present in the 'x' byte.
* Modifications and alignment of updateCtx() with EDHOC.
* Rules for deletion of old EDHOC keys PRK_out and PRK_exporter.
* Describe CBOR wrapping of involved nonces with examples.
* Renamed 'id detail' to 'nonce'.
* Editorial improvements.
C.3. Version -00 to -01
* Recommendation on limits for CCM_8. Details in Appendix.
* Improved message processing, also covering corner cases.
* Example of method to estimate and not store 'count_q'.
* Added procedure to update OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs.
* Added method for preserving observations across key updates.
* Added key update without forward secrecy.
Acknowledgments
The authors sincerely thank Christian Amsüss, Carsten Bormann, John
Preuß Mattsson and Göran Selander for their feedback and comments.
The work on this document has been partly supported by VINNOVA and
the Celtic-Next project CRITISEC; and by the H2020 project SIFIS-Home
(Grant agreement 952652).
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Authors' Addresses
Rikard Höglund
RISE AB
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: rikard.hoglund@ri.se
Marco Tiloca
RISE AB
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: marco.tiloca@ri.se
Höglund & Tiloca Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 54]