Best Practices for Securing RTP Media Signaled with SIP
draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-08

Network Working Group                                        J. Peterson
Internet-Draft                                                   Neustar
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         R. Barnes
Expires: October 27, 2019                                          Cisco
                                                              R. Housley
                                                          Vigil Security
                                                          April 25, 2019

        Best Practices for Securing RTP Media Signaled with SIP
                     draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-08

Abstract

   Although the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) includes a suite of
   security services that has been expanded by numerous specifications
   over the years, there is no single place that explains how to use SIP
   to establish confidential media sessions.  Additionally, existing
   mechanisms have some feature gaps that need to be identified and
   resolved in order for them to address the pervasive monitoring threat
   model.  This specification describes best practices for negotiating
   confidential media with SIP, including a comprehensive protection
   solution that binds the media layer to SIP layer identities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security at the SIP and SDP layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  STIR Profile for Endpoint Authentication and Verification
       Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Anonymous Communications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Connected Identity Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  Authorization Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Media Security Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Relayed Media and Conferencing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  ICE and Connected Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Best Current Practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] includes a suite of
   security services, including Digest authentication, for
   authenticating entities with a shared secret, TLS for transport
   security, and S/MIME (optionally) for body security.  SIP is
   frequently used to establish media sessions, in particular audio or
   audiovisual sessions, which have their own security mechanisms
   available, such as Secure RTP [RFC3711].  However, the practices
   needed to bind security at the media layer to security at the SIP
   layer, to provide an assurance that protection is in place all the
   way up the stack, rely on a great many external security mechanisms
   and practices.  This document provides documentation to explain their
   optimal use as a best practice.

   Revelations about widespread pervasive monitoring of the Internet
   have led to a greater desire to protect Internet communications

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   [RFC7258].  In order to maximize the use of security features,
   especially of media confidentiality, opportunistic measures serve as
   a stopgap when a full suite of services cannot be negotiated all the
   way up the stack.  Opportunistic media security for SIP is described
   in [I-D.ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp], which builds on the prior efforts of
   [I-D.kaplan-mmusic-best-effort-srtp].  With opportunistic encryption,
   there is an attempt to negotiate the use of encryption, but if the
   negotiation fails, then cleartext is used.  Opportunistic encryption
   approaches typically have no integrity protection for the keying
   material.

   This document contains the SIPBRANDY profile of STIR [RFC8224] for
   media confidentiality, providing a comprehensive security solution
   for SIP media that includes integrity protection for keying material
   and offers application-layer assurance that media confidentiality is
   place.  Various specifications that user agents must implement to
   support media confidentiality are given in the sections below; a
   summary of the best current practices appears in Section 8.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Security at the SIP and SDP layer

   There are two approaches to providing confidentiality for media
   sessions set up with SIP: comprehensive protection and opportunistic
   security (as defined in [RFC7435]).  This document only addresses
   comprehensive protection.

   Comprehensive protection for media sessions established by SIP
   requires the interaction of three protocols: Session Initiation
   Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261], the Session Description Protocol (SDP)
   [RFC4566], and the Real-time Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550], in particular
   its secure profile Secure RTP (SRTP) [RFC3711].  Broadly, it is the
   responsibility of SIP to provide integrity protection for the media
   keying attributes conveyed by SDP, and those attributes will in turn
   identify the keys used by endpoints in the RTP media session(s) that
   SDP negotiates.

   Note that this framework does not apply to keys that also require
   confidentiality protection in the signaling layer, such as the SDP
   "k=" line, which MUST NOT be used in conjunction with this profile.

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 3]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   In that way, once SIP and SDP have exchanged the necessary
   information to initiate a session, media endpoints will have a strong
   assurance that the keys they exchange have not been tampered with by
   third parties, and that end-to-end confidentiality is available.

   To establishing the identity of the endpoints of a SIP session, this
   specification uses STIR [RFC8224].  The STIR Identity header has been
   designed to prevent a class of impersonation attacks that are
   commonly used in robocalling, voicemail hacking, and related threats.
   STIR generates a signature over certain features of SIP requests,
   including header field values that contain an identity for the
   originator of the request, such as the From header field or P-
   Asserted-Identity field, and also over the media keys in SDP if they
   are present.  As currently defined, STIR provides a signature over
   the "a=fingerprint" attribute, which is a fingerprint of the key used
   by DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763]; consequently, STIR only offers comprehensive
   protection for SIP sessions in concert with SDP and SRTP when DTLS-
   SRTP is the media security service.  The underlying PASSporT
   [RFC8225] object used by STIR is extensible, however, and it would be
   possible to provide signatures over other SDP attributes that contain
   alternate keying material.  A profile for using STIR to provide media
   confidentiality is given in Section 4.

4.  STIR Profile for Endpoint Authentication and Verification Services

   STIR [RFC8224] defines the Identity header field for SIP, which
   provides a cryptographic attestation of the source of communications.
   This document includes a profile of STIR, called the SIPBRANDY
   profile, where the STIR verification service will act in concert with
   an SRTP media endpoint to ensure that the key fingerprints, as given
   in SDP, match the keys exchanged to establish DTLS-SRTP.  To satisfy
   this condition, the verification service function would in this case
   be implemented in the SIP User Agent Server (UAS), which would be
   composed with the media endpoint.  If the STIR authentication service
   or verification service functions are implemented at an intermediary
   rather than an endpoint, this introduces the possibility that the
   intermediary could act as a man in the middle, altering key
   fingerprints.  As this attack is not in STIR's core threat model,
   which focuses on impersonation rather than man-in-the-middle attacks,
   STIR offers no specific protections against such interference.

   The SIPBRANDY profile for media confidentiality thus shifts these
   responsibilities to the endpoints rather than the intermediaries.
   While intermediaries MAY provide the verification service function of
   STIR for SIPBRANDY transactions, the verification needs to be
   repeated at the endpoint to obtain end-to-end assurance.
   Intermediaries supporting this specification MUST NOT block or
   otherwise redirect calls if they do not trust the signing credential.

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 4]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   The SIPBRANDY profile is based on an end-to-end trust model, so it is
   up to the endpoints to determine if they support signing credentials,
   not intermediaries.

   In order to be compliant with best practices for SIP media
   confidentiality with comprehensive protection, user agent
   implementations MUST implement both the authentication service and
   verification service roles described in [RFC8224].  STIR
   authentication services MUST signal their compliance with this
   specification by including the "msec" claim defined in this
   specification to the PASSporT payload.  Implementations MUST provide
   key fingerprints in SDP and the appropriate signatures over them as
   specified in [RFC8225].

   When generating either an offer or an answer [RFC3264], compliant
   implementations MUST include an "a=fingerprint" attribute containing
   the fingerprint of an appropriate key (see Section 4.1).

4.1.  Credentials

   In order to implement the authentication service function in the user
   agent, SIP endpoints will need to acquire the credentials needed to
   sign for their own identity.  That identity is typically carried in
   the From header field of a SIP request, and either contains a
   greenfield SIP URI (e.g. "sip:alice@example.com") or a telephone
   number, which can appear in a variety of ways (e.g.
   "sip:+17004561212@example.com;user=phone").  Section 8 of [RFC8224]
   contains guidance for separating the two, and determining what sort
   of credential is needed to sign for each.

   To date, few commercial certification authorities (CAs) issue
   certificates for SIP URIs or telephone numbers; though work is
   ongoing on systems for this purpose (such as
   [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token]) it is not yet mature enough to be
   recommended as a best practice.  This is one reason why STIR permits
   intermediaries to act as an authentication service on behalf of an
   entire domain, just as in SIP a proxy server can provide domain-level
   SIP service.  While CAs that offer proof-of-possession certificates
   similar to those used for email could be offered for SIP, either for
   greenfield identifiers or for telephone numbers, this specification
   does not require their use.

   For users who do not possess such certificates, DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763]
   permits the use of self-signed public keys.  This profile of STIR
   employs more relaxed authority requirements of [RFC8224] to allow the
   use of self-signed public keys for authentication services that are
   composed with user agents, by generating a certificate (per the
   guidance in [RFC8226]) with a subject corresponding to the user's

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 5]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   identity.  To obtain comprehensive protection with a self-signed
   certificate, some out-of-band verification is needed as well.  Such a
   credential could be used for trust on first use (see [RFC7435]) by
   relying parties.  Note that relying parties SHOULD NOT use
   certificate revocation mechanisms or real-time certificate
   verification systems for self-signed certificates as they will not
   increase confidence in the certificate.

   Users who wish to remain anonymous can instead generate self-signed
   certificates as described in Section 4.2.

   Generally speaking, without access to out-of-band information about
   which certificates were issued to whom, it will be very difficult for
   relying parties to ascertain whether or not the signer of a SIP
   request is genuinely an "endpoint."  Even the term "endpoint" is a
   problematic one, as SIP user agents can be composed in a variety of
   architectures and may not be devices under direct user control.
   While it is possible that techniques based on certificate
   transparency [RFC6962] or similar practices could help user agents to
   recognize one another's certificates, those operational systems will
   need to ramp up with the CAs that issue credentials to end user
   devices going forward.

4.2.  Anonymous Communications

   In some cases, the identity of the initiator of a SIP session may be
   withheld due to user or provider policy.  Following the
   recommendations of [RFC3323], this may involve using an identity such
   as "anonymous@anonymous.invalid" in the identity fields of a SIP
   request.  [RFC8224] does not currently permit authentication services
   to sign for requests that supply this identity.  It does however
   permit signing for valid domains, such as "anonymous@example.com," as
   a way of implementation an anonymization service as specified in
   [RFC3323].

   Even for anonymous sessions, providing media confidentiality and
   partial SDP integrity is still desirable.  This specification
   RECOMMENDS using one-time self-signed certificates for anonymous
   communications, with a subjectAltName of
   "sip:anonymous@anonymous.invalid".  After a session is terminated,
   the certificate SHOULD be discarded, and a new one, with fresh keying
   material, SHOULD be generated before each future anonymous call.  As
   with self-signed certificates, relying parties SHOULD NOT use
   certificate revocation mechanisms or real-time certificate
   verification systems for anonymous certificates as they will not
   increase confidence in the certificate.

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 6]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   Note that when using one-time anonymous self-signed certificates, any
   man in the middle could strip the Identity header and replace it with
   one signed by its own one-time certificate, changing the "mkey"
   parameters of PASSporT and any "a=fingerprint" attributes in SDP as
   it chooses.  This signature only provides protection against non-
   Identity aware entities that might modify SDP without altering the
   PASSporT conveyed in the Identity header.

4.3.  Connected Identity Usage

   STIR [RFC8224] provides integrity protection for the fingerprint
   attributes in SIP request bodies, but not SIP responses.  When a
   session is established, therefore, any SDP body carried by a 200
   class response in the backwards direction will not be protected by an
   authentication service and cannot be verified.  Thus, sending a
   secured SDP body in the backwards direction will require an extra
   RTT, typically a request sent in the backwards direction.

   The problem of providing "Connected Identity" in [RFC4474], which is
   obsoleted by STIR, was explored in [RFC4916], which uses a
   provisional or mid-dialog UPDATE request in the backwards direction
   to convey an Identity header field for the recipient of an INVITE.
   The procedures in that specification are largely compatible with the
   revision of the Identity header in STIR [RFC8224].  However, the
   following need to be considered:

      The UPDATE carrying signed SDP with a fingerprint in the backwards
      direction needs to be sent during dialog establishment, following
      the receipt of a PRACK after a provisional 1xx response.

      For use with this SIPBRANDY profile for media confidentiality, the
      UAS that responds to the INVITE request needs to act as an
      authentication service for the UPDATE sent in the backwards
      direction.

      The text in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC4916] regarding the receipt at a
      UAC of error codes 428, 436, 437 and 438 in response to a mid-
      dialog request RECOMMENDS treating the dialog as terminated.
      However, Section 6.1.1 of [RFC8224] allows the retransmission of
      requests with repairable error conditions.  In particular, an
      authentication service might retry a mid-dialog rather than
      treating the dialog as terminated, although only one such retry is
      permitted.

      Note that the examples in [RFC4916] are based on the original
      [RFC4474], and will not match signatures using STIR [RFC8224].

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 7]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   Future work may be done to revise [RFC4916] for STIR; that work
   should take into account any impacts on the SIPBRANDY profile
   described in this document.  The use of [RFC4916] has some further
   interactions with ICE; see Section 7.

4.4.  Authorization Decisions

   [RFC8224] grants STIR verification services a great deal of latitude
   when making authorization decisions based on the presence of the
   Identity header field.  It is largely a matter of local policy
   whether an endpoint rejects a call based on absence of an Identity
   header field, or even the presence of a header that fails an
   integrity check against the request.

   For this SIPBRANDY profile of STIR, however, a compliant verification
   service that receives a dialog-forming SIP request containing an
   Identity header with a PASSporT type of "msec", after validating the
   request per the steps described in Section 6.2 of [RFC8224], MUST
   reject the request if there is any failure in that validation process
   with the appropriate status code per Section 6.2.2.  If the request
   is valid, then if a terminating user accepts the request, it MUST
   then follow the steps in Section 4.3 to act as an authentication
   service and send a signed request with the "msec" PASSPorT type in
   its Identity header as well, in order to enable end-to-end
   bidirectional confidentiality.

   For the purposes of this profile, the "msec" PASSporT type can be
   used by authentication services in one of two ways: as a mandatory
   request for media security, or as a merely opportunistic request for
   media security.  As any verification service that receives an
   Identity header field in a SIP request with an unrecognized PASSporT
   type will simply ignore that Identity header, an authentication
   service will know whether or not the terminating side supports "msec"
   based on whether or not its user agent receives a signed request in
   the backwards direction per Section 4.3.  If no such requests are
   received, the UA may do one or two things: shut down the dialog, if
   the policy of the UA requires that "msec" be supported by the
   terminating side for this dialog; or, if policy permits (e.g., an
   explicit acceptance by the user), allow the dialog to continue
   without media security.

5.  Media Security Protocols

   As there are several ways to negotiate media security with SDP, any
   of which might be used with either opportunistic or comprehensive
   protection, further guidance to implementers is needed.  In
   [I-D.ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp], opportunistic approaches considered

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 8]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   include DTLS-SRTP, security descriptions [RFC4568], and ZRTP
   [RFC6189].

   Support for DTLS-SRTP is REQUIRED by this specification.

   The "mkey" claim of PASSporT provides integrity protection for
   "a=fingerprint" attributes in SDP, including cases where multiple
   "a=fingerprint" attributes appear in the same SDP.

6.  Relayed Media and Conferencing

   Providing end-to-end media confidentiality for SIP is complicated by
   the presence of many forms of media relays.  While many media relays
   merely proxy media to a destination, others present themselves as
   media endpoints and terminate security associations before re-
   originating media to its destination.

   Centralized conference bridges are one type of entity that typically
   terminates a media session in order to mux media from multiple
   sources and then to re-originate the muxed media to conference
   participants.  In many such implementations, only hop-by-hop media
   confidentiality is possible.  Work is ongoing to specify a means to
   encrypt both the hop-by-hop media between a user agent and a
   centralized server as well as the end-to-end media between user
   agents, but is not sufficiently mature at this time to make a
   recommendation for a best practice here.  Those protocols are
   expected to identify their own best practice recommendations as they
   mature.

   Another class of entities that might relay SIP media are back-to-back
   user agents (B2BUAs).  If a B2BUA follows the guidance in [RFC7879],
   it may be possible for those devices to act as media relays while
   still permitting end-to-end confidentiality between user agents.

   Ultimately, if an endpoint can decrypt media it receives, then that
   endpoint can forward the decrypted media without the knowledge or
   consent of the media's originator.  No media confidentiality
   mechanism can protect against these sorts of relayed disclosures, or
   trusted entities that can decrypt media and then record a copy to be
   sent elsewhere (see [RFC7245]).

7.  ICE and Connected Identity

   Providing confidentiality for media with comprehensive protection
   requires careful timing of when media streams should be sent and when
   a user interface should signify that confidentiality is in place.

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019                [Page 9]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   In order to best enable end-to-end connectivity between user agents,
   and to avoid media relays as much as possible, implementations of
   this specification MUST support ICE [RFC8445].  To speed up call
   establishment, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations support trickle
   ICE [I-D.ietf-mmusic-trickle-ice-sip].

   Note that in the comprehensive protection case, the use of Connected
   Identity [RFC4916] with ICE entails that the answer containing the
   key fingerprints, and thus the STIR signature, will come in an UPDATE
   sent in the backwards direction, a provisional response, and a
   provisional acknowledgment (PRACK), rather than in any earlier SDP
   body.  Only at such a time as that UPDATE is received will the media
   keys be considered exchanged in this case.

   Similarly, in order to prevent, or at least mitigate, the denial-of-
   service attack described in Section 19.5.1 of [RFC8445], this
   specification incorporates best practices for ensuring that
   recipients of media flows have consented to receive such flows.
   Implementations of this specification MUST implement the STUN usage
   for consent freshness defined in [RFC7675].

8.  Best Current Practices

   The following are the best practices for SIP user agents to provide
   media confidentiality for SIP sessions.

   Implementations MUST support the STIR endpoint profile given in
   Section 4, and signal that in PASSporT with the "msec" header
   element.

   Implementations MUST follow the authorization decision behavior in
   Section 4.4.

   Implementations MUST support DTLS-SRTP for key-management, as
   described in Section 5.

   Implementations MUST support the ICE, and the STUN consent freshness
   mechanism, as specified in Section 7.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This specification defines a new value for the Personal Assertion
   Token (PASSporT) Extensions registry called "msec," and the IANA is
   requested to add that entry to the registry with a value pointing to
   [RFCThis].

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019               [Page 10]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

10.  Security Considerations

   This document describes the security features that provide media
   sessions established with SIP with confidentiality, integrity, and
   authentication.

11.  Acknowledgments

   We thank Eric Rescorla, Adam Roach, Andrew Hutton, and Ben Campbell
   for contributions to this problem statement and framework.  We thank
   Liang Xia and Alissa Cooper for their careful review.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-mmusic-trickle-ice-sip]
              Ivov, E., Stach, T., Marocco, E., and C. Holmberg, "A
              Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Usage for Incremental
              Provisioning of Candidates for the Interactive
              Connectivity Establishment (Trickle ICE)", draft-ietf-
              mmusic-trickle-ice-sip-18 (work in progress), June 2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.

   [RFC3264]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
              with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264>.

   [RFC3323]  Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3323, November 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3323>.

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
              July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019               [Page 11]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.

   [RFC4566]  Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
              Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
              July 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>.

   [RFC4568]  Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session
              Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media
              Streams", RFC 4568, DOI 10.17487/RFC4568, July 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4568>.

   [RFC4916]  Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4916, DOI 10.17487/RFC4916, June
              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4916>.

   [RFC5763]  Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework
              for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
              (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer
              Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7675]  Perumal, M., Wing, D., Ravindranath, R., Reddy, T., and M.
              Thomson, "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Usage
              for Consent Freshness", RFC 7675, DOI 10.17487/RFC7675,
              October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7675>.

   [RFC7879]  Ravindranath, R., Reddy, T., Salgueiro, G., Pascual, V.,
              and P. Ravindran, "DTLS-SRTP Handling in SIP Back-to-Back
              User Agents", RFC 7879, DOI 10.17487/RFC7879, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7879>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8224]  Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
              "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019               [Page 12]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   [RFC8225]  Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
              Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.

   [RFC8226]  Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
              Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.

   [RFC8445]  Keranen, A., Holmberg, C., and J. Rosenberg, "Interactive
              Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network
              Address Translator (NAT) Traversal", RFC 8445,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8445, July 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8445>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token]
              Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME
              Challenges Using an Authority Token", draft-ietf-acme-
              authority-token-03 (work in progress), March 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp]
              Johnston, A., Aboba, B., Hutton, A., Jesske, R., and T.
              Stach, "An Opportunistic Approach for Secure Real-time
              Transport Protocol (OSRTP)", draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-08
              (work in progress), March 2019.

   [I-D.kaplan-mmusic-best-effort-srtp]
              Audet, F. and H. Kaplan, "Session Description Protocol
              (SDP) Offer/Answer Negotiation For Best-Effort Secure
              Real-Time Transport Protocol", draft-kaplan-mmusic-best-
              effort-srtp-01 (work in progress), October 2006.

   [RFC4474]  Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
              Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4474, August 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4474>.

   [RFC6189]  Zimmermann, P., Johnston, A., Ed., and J. Callas, "ZRTP:
              Media Path Key Agreement for Unicast Secure RTP",
              RFC 6189, DOI 10.17487/RFC6189, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6189>.

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019               [Page 13]
Internet-Draft                RTP Security                    April 2019

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
              Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.

   [RFC7245]  Hutton, A., Ed., Portman, L., Ed., Jain, R., and K. Rehor,
              "An Architecture for Media Recording Using the Session
              Initiation Protocol", RFC 7245, DOI 10.17487/RFC7245, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7245>.

   [RFC7435]  Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
              Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
              December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jon Peterson
   Neustar, Inc.

   Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar

   Richard Barnes
   Cisco

   Email: rlb@ipv.sx

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC

   Email: housley@vigilsec.com

Peterson, et al.        Expires October 27, 2019               [Page 14]